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Trial Practice and Procedure
by C. Frederick Overby*
and
Teresa T. Abell*"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Developments in the law of personal jurisdiction and venue, the
professional malpractice affidavit pleading requirement embodied by
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 9-11-9.1,' and
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel continued to refine
the law during this survey period. Additionally, this survey reviews
significant decisions discussing disqualification of jurors for cause,
actions for prenatal injuries, procedure in connection with trials
involving default judgment, and remedies for spoliation of evidence. Due
to the number of decisions, this review seeks to analyze the most
significant and practical developments in the areas of trial practice and
procedure in Georgia for the survey period.

* Partner in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Overby, Pearson, Fryhofer & Daughtery,
Columbus & Atlanta, Georgia, and Member of the Board of Visitors, Walter F. George
School of Law, Mercer University. Georgia Southwestern State University (B.S., 1981);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., 1984). Prior Publications: What's
A Human Life Really Worth?, Recovering Damages for Decedents'Non-Economic Losses in
Georgia Wrongful Death Actions, 7 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 439 (1991); The Case ForAllowing
Punitive Damages in Georgia Wrongful Death Actions: The Need to Remove an Unjust
Anomaly in Georgia Law, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1993); Trial Practice & Procedure, 47
MERCER L. REV. 353 (1995).

** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Overby, Pearson, Fryhofer & Daughtery,
Columbus & Atlanta, Georgia. Columbus State University (B.A., summa cum laude, 1991);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1995).
Georgia Survey Editor, Mercer Law Review (1994-95). Author: Gestational Surrogacy:
Intent-Based Parenthoodin Johnson v. Calvert, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1429 (1994). Member,
State Bar of Georgia, Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, and Columbus Bar Association.
1. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993).
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PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The most judicial activity in the area of personal jurisdiction during
the survey period occurred in cases involving nonresident foreign
corporations. In five cases, the court of appeals refined Georgia law
relating to personal jurisdiction, particularly as applied to nonresident
foreign corporations.
A.

Nonresident Foreign Corporations

Is "general jurisdiction" applicable to foreign corporations in
Georgia? The most significant holding on personal jurisdiction during
this year's survey period came in the case of Pratt & Whitney Canada,
Inc. v. Sanders.2 In this case, the plaintiffs were not Georgia residents,
the defendant was a foreign corporation, and the alleged tort, a plane
crash, occurred in Kentucky.' Defendant, Pratt & Whitney Canada,
Inc., challenged personal jurisdiction.4 Plaintiffs argued that regardless
of the fact that the defendant's tortious conduct had insufficient Georgia
connections to invoke the Long Arm Statute, Pratt & Whitney's
continuous and systematic-albeit unrelated-activity within Georgia
established the company's "presence" within the state so that it could be
subjected to general personal jurisdiction in Georgia in any case.'
The court held that with respect to nonresident foreign corporations,
the only way to establish personal jurisdiction is by showing the type of
specific contacts set forth in the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. section 910-90. 6

The court relied on the Long Arm Statute's definition of

nonresident to include foreign corporations not authorized to transact
business in Georgia.' Judge McMurray argued in his dissent that the
Long Arm Statute is merely a form of asserting "specific jurisdiction"
over a nonresident based on that party's conduct within the state.'
The Long Arm Statute makes no attempt to address general jurisdiction over a party who is neither (1) a resident of the state, nor (2)
present within its borders.9 The court recognized that a resident
corporation, as defined in the Long Arm Statute, like a resident

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

218 Ga. App. 1, 460 S.E.2d 94 (1995).
Id. at 1, 460 S.E.2d at 95.
Id.
Id. at 3, 460 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 2, 460 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 2 n.2., 460 S.E.2d at 95 n.2.
Id. at 6, 460 S.E.2d at 99 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting).
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 (1982).
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individual, can be subject to general jurisdiction because of its presence
within the state."0 The court failed to explain why a nonresident
corporation, unlike a nonresident individual, cannot be held liable based
on transitory "presence" within the state. The United States Supreme
Court has held that a foreign corporation can be deemed "present" so
that general jurisdiction can be exercised if that corporation's activities
The fact that
within the state are continuous and systematic."
Georgia's Long Arm Statute defines "nonresident" to include foreign
corporations not authorized to transact business in Georgia should make
no difference.' 2 The statutory definition of nonresident also encompasses individuals who reside in another state,13 yet the court concedes that
such individuals are subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia if present
in Georgia when served with process."
The court's apparent elimination of "general jurisdiction" with respect
to nonresident foreign corporations creates an anomaly in the law and
an illogical result. 5 Foreign corporations that obey Georgia law and
register to transact business here are declared subject to personal
jurisdiction in Georgia in any case, regardless of whether the conduct at
issue would satisfy the Long Arm Statute. Conversely, foreign corporations that engage in continuous and systematic activity in Georgia, but
do not bother to register with the Secretary of State, are rewarded with
immunity from suit here, unless the Long Arm Statute applies.
Does the failure to answer a complaint resulting in default
preclude a defendant foreign corporation from subsequently
attacking jurisdiction? In two very similar cases, Hoesch America,
Inc. v. Dai Yang Metal Co., 16 and B & D Fabricators v. D.H. Blair
Investment Banking Corp., 7 the court of appeals held that foreign
corporate defendants did not waive their personal jurisdiction defenses
by failing to answer the plaintiffs' complaints and allowing the actions
to go into default.' The court relied on established federal authority,
which holds that "[a] defendant is always free to ignore the judicial

10. 218 Ga. App. at 2, 460 S.E.2d at 95.
11. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984).
12. See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90.
13. Id.
14. Pratt & Whitney Canada,Inc., 218 Ga. App. at 3, 460 S.E.2d at 96.
15. Id. at 7,460 S.E.2d at 99 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting) (citing Helicopteros,466 U.S.
at 414 n.9).
16. 217 Ga. App. 845, 459 S.E.2d 187 (1995).
17. 220 Ga. App. 373, 469 S.E.2d 683 (1996).
18. Hoesch America, Inc., 217 Ga. App. at 845, 459 S.E.2d at 188-89; B & D
Fabricators, 220 Ga. App. at 373, 469 S.E.2d at 684-85.
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proceedings, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that judgment
on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding." 9
The court glossed over the fact that in both cases, the challenge to the
underlying judgment came not in a collateral proceeding, but directly in
the case at issue. Such a "direct attack" upon jurisdiction, the court
held, is authorized by O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60(d)(1) and (f0,20 which
allows a party to bring a motion to21 set aside a judgment void for lack of
personal jurisdiction at any time.
In B & D Fabricators,the court also seemed to answer another
practical personal jurisdiction question: When has a defendant made a
general appearance in a case so as to waive the personal jurisdiction
defense? It has long been the rule that "[glenerally ... a waiver results
when a nonresident submits to the jurisdiction of the court by seeking
a ruling from the court on the merits of the case or otherwise enters a
general appearance without raising the issue."22 Seemingly at odds
with this general principle, however, is the notion that a defendant may
answer a complaint on the merits while simultaneously preserving, by
objection, his or her personal jurisdiction defense.23
The defendant in B & D Fabricatorshad addressed the merits in its
initial pleadings, but had also objected based on lack of personal
jurisdiction. 24 The court noted that the defendant's initial pleadings
were a request to open the default judgment, which requires that the
defendant set up a meritorious defense. 25 The reason the personal
jurisdiction defense was not waived, however, became a matter of
timing.2 "Inasmuch as [the defendant] did not plead to the merits
without raising a jurisdictional defense, there was no waiver."2 7 Thus,
the court seemed to indicate that pleading the merits of the case does
not result in waiver as long as the defendant simultaneously raises the
personal jurisdiction defense.

19. Hoesch America, Inc., 217 Ga. App. at 846, 459 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting Insurance
Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982)). See also Baldwin v. Iowa
State, Assoc., 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).
20. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60 (1993).
21. Hoesch America, Inc., 217 Ga. App. at 847, 459 S.E.2d at 189.
22. Id. at 848, 459 S.E.2d at 187.
23. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(h) (allowing defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in
answer defending on merits).
24. B & D Fabricators, 220 Ga. App. at 374, 469 S.E.2d at 685.
25. Id.

26. Id.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
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What is the plaintiff's burden when the defendant challenges
personal jurisdiction? In Cobb County v. Jones Group P.L.C.,25 the
court of appeals reaffirmed the procedural requirements for making and
opposing a challenge to personal jurisdiction. The defendant has the
ultimate burden of proving lack of personal jurisdiction. 29 Nonetheless,
a motion to dismiss must be granted if the plaintiff cannot show
sufficient facts to create an inference that jurisdiction exists.30 A
defendant may raise matters outside the pleadings by offering testimony
by affidavit or other proper evidence, and if the defendant's evidence
pierces the plaintiff's pleadings, the plaintiff then has the burden of
coming forward with evidence which creates an inference that jurisdiction exists.3 ' In other words, the court has adopted a procedure similar
to the familiar procedure on motions for summary judgment.3 2
Jurisdictionover Nonresident Individuals
In Phears v. Doyne,33 the court of appeals again relied on the long
line of cases which held that an advertisement in a national publication
and a subsequent contract with a Georgia resident is not transaction of
business in Georgia pursuant to the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. section

B.

9-10-91(1). 34

The court also held that with respect to tort claims, a

defendant is required only to submit an affidavit denying the type of
contacts set forth in the Long Arm Statute, and if the plaintiff cannot
rebut35 the allegations contained in the affidavit, jurisdiction cannot
exist.

28. 218 Ga. App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516 (1995).
29. Id. at 149, 460 S.E.2d at 518.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56.
33. 220 Ga. App. 550, 470 S.E.2d 236 (1996).
34. Id. at 551, 470 S.E.2d at 237. See Flint v. Gust, 180 Ga. App. 904, 351 S.E.2d 95
(1986); Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129,356 S.E.2d 503 (1987); Smith v. Air Ambulance Network,
207 Ga. App. 75, 427 S.E.2d 305 (1993); A.A.A. v. Lindburg, 172 Ga. App. 753, 324 S.E.2d
480 (1984).
35. 220 Ga. App. at 552, 470 S.E.2d at 237 (citing Gust, 257 Ga. at 130, 356 S.E.2d at
504).
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SERVICE OF PROCESS

A.

Service on an Uninsured Motorist Carrier
The courts addressed several issues involving service of process in this
year's survey period. First, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the
issue of service of process on an uninsured motorist ("UM") carrier which
was not perfected until two days after the statute of limitations had
expired.36 In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kilgore,37
the underlying accident occurred on May 31, 1990, and the plaintiffs
filed a claim against the owner of the other vehicle on February 15,
1991. After it was determined that the tractor was uninsured, the
plaintiffs requested the sheriff to serve a copy of their claim on their UM
carrier on May 15, 1992, which was within the two year statute of
limitation.38 The sheriff did not perfect service until June 2, 1992-two
days after the limitations period expired-due to the UM carrier's
agent's absence from the country until that date.3 9 The trial court
denied the insurance carrier's motion to dismiss on the ground that
service was untimely, ° and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. 4'
The issue before the supreme court was whether a significant delay
between the filing of the tort claim and service on the uninsured
motorist carrier required dismissal when, within the applicable period
of limitations, the plaintiff sought to have the uninsured motorist carrier
served and service was perfected within a reasonable time thereafter,
but outside of the period of limitations.42 The court answered this in
the negative and affirmed the trial court's denial of the insurance
carrier's motion to dismiss.
The statute dealing with uninsured motorist coverage, O.C.G.A.
section 33-7-11(d), requires service of the pleading on the UM carrier as
though the carrier were actually named as a defendant in the tort
action." The Supreme Court of Georgia looked to the law governing

36. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 265 Ga. 836,836,462 S.E.2d 713,
714 (1995).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (d) (Supp. 1996).
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relation back of service to the filing of the lawsuit45 and focused on the
diligence of the plaintiff in perfecting service.4 Noting that O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-4 does not provide a time limit within which service must
be initiated by the plaintiff, the court found that the mere time lapse
between the date of filing and the date of service is not a valid basis for
dismissal.47 The court then narrowed the time on which to focus on the
plaintiff's diligence, stating that the focus is on the plaintiff's efforts
after becoming aware that the process server failed to perfect service,
rather than on the time lapse between the initial filing of the claim and
the first effort to have it served.48 The court held that under the
circumstances of the case, the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence,
and the carrier's motion to dismiss was properly denied.49
Service of Process for Renewal Actions
In two cases, the court of appeals stood firmly behind the rule that a
renewal action is valid only if the defendant is properly served before the
statute of limitations runs in the original action. 0 In Ludi v. Van
Metre,5 the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against a
physician and sought to have process served on him.5 2 The process
server handed the complaint and summons to a receptionist in Dr. Ludi's
office; however, Dr. Ludi's subsequent affidavit stated that she was not
authorized to accept service for him. Service was attempted again at
Ludi's home, but outside of the statute of limitations.53
Plaintiff Van Metre. then voluntarily dismissed her suit without
prejudice and filed a renewal action.54 The court of appeals stated that
"for the purpose of the renewal statute, the mere filing of the initial suit
does not operate to toll the statute of limitation. In order for a case to
B.

45. 265 Ga. at 837, 462 S.E.2d at 714. "If the timely filing of the pleadings is followed
by timely service perfected as authorized by law, the subsequent service will relate back
to the initial filing even though the statute of limitations has run in the interim." Id.
46. 265 Ga. at 837, 462 S.E.2d at 714-15.
47. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 715 (citing Childs v. Catlin, 134 Ga. App. 778, 782, 216 S.E.2d
360 (1975)).
48. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 715.
49. Id. at 838, 462 S.E.2d at 715. Justice Fletcher, in a special concurrence, opined
that diligence in service should be measured from the date of the filing of the complaint,
and that the majority's new rule relieves the plaintiff of the responsibility to promptly
initiate service after filing the complaint. 265 Ga. at 838, 462 S.E.2d at 715 (Fletcher, P.J.,
concurring specially).
50. See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (Supp. 1996) (renewal statute).
51. Ludi v. Van Metre, 221 Ga. App. 479, 471 S.E.2d 913 (1996).
52. Id. at 480, 471 S.E.2d at 914.
53. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 914-15.
54. Id., S.E.2d at 915.
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qualify as a renewal action, 'the earlier filing must have been a valid
action, with proper service on [defendant].'" 55 Because service on a
receptionist was not proper personal service in the original action before
the running of the statute of limitations, the suit could not be renewed. 6 The court did not address the issue of whether the subsequent attempt to perfect service at Ludi's residence outside the statute
of limitations related back to the date of filing the lawsuit, but only
stated that that attempt at service occurred outside the statute of
limitation. 7
Similarly, in Brooks v. Young,5" the court of appeals held that
improper service of process on a minor alone within the statute of
limitation would not suffice for a renewal action."9 The plaintiff in
Brooks filed a complaint against a minor, which was served only on
Brooks, the minor, and not on her parents or guardians." After Brooks
reached her majority, and after the statute of limitation had run, the
plaintiff again served Brooks. The court held that it found no authority
to support the theory that service after reaching majority and after the
statute of limitation had expired could somehow cure the defective
service on her as a minor.6" Because the plaintiff did not strictly
comply with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-4(d)(3),62 and service was not
perfected prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation, the original
suit was void and could not be renewed. 3
C. Service on the Georgia Department of Transportation
The court of appeals interpreted the service provision of O.C.G.A.

section 32-2-5(b)64 in Department of Transportation v. Marks.65 This
statute provides that service of process may be accomplished by
personally serving the commissioner of the Georgia Department of
Transportation ("D.O.T.") or by leaving a copy of the same in the office
of the commissioner in the D.O.T. building in Atlanta." In Marks, the

55.
S.E.2d
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 481,471 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting Finch v. Weaver, 213 Ga. App. 514, 515, 445
289 (1994)).
Id. at 482, 471 S.E.2d at 915.
Id., 471 S.E.2d at 916.
220 Ga. App. 47, 467 S.E.2d 230 (1996).
Id. at 48, 467 S.E.2d at 232.
Id. at 47,467 S.E.2d at 231. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(d)(3) (1993) (service on a minor).
220 Ga. App. at 48, 467 S.E.2d at 231.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(d)(3).
220 Ga. App. at 48, 467 S.E.2d at 231.
O.C.G.A. § 32-2-5(b) (1996).
219 Ga. App. 738, 466 S.E.2d 273 (1995).
O.C.G.A. § 32-2-5(b) (1996).
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plaintiff served the D.O.T. by placing a copy of the summons and
complaint in a package addressed to the D.O.T. Commissioner at his
office in the D.O.T. building in Atlanta and having it delivered by United
Parcel Service ("U.P.S."). U.P.S. delivered the package to the mailroom
manager, who delivered it to the commissioner's office." The trial
court held that service was sufficient under O.C.G.A. section 32-2-5(b),
and held the D.O.T. in default for failure to file an answer."
The court of appeals reversed, stating that the language of O.C.G.A.
section 32-2-5(b) did not evidence the legislature's intention to authorize
a form of service in substitution for the personal service required by the
common law and by O.C.G.A. section 9-11-4. 69 The court interpreted
the service statute as providing that service may be accomplished by
personally serving a person other than the D.O.T Commissioner in the
commissioner's office who is authorized or otherwise qualified to receive
service on behalf of the D.O.T 7 Furthermore, the personal service
must be made by an authorized person.71 While U.P.S. may deliver,
they cannot properly accomplish service of process under this statute.
D. Acknowledgment of Service Document is not a Waiver of Service of
Summons
The court of appeals also decided whether a defendant had waived
service of summons by signing an acknowledgment of service document.72 In Stamps v. Bank South, N.A. , the defendant had defaulted
on a promissory note and had made an agreement with the bank to pay
back the money owed. As part of the agreement, Stamps executed an
acknowledgment of service. When Stamps failed to make his payments,
the bank notified him that it was proceeding under the agreement to
take judgment against him. The bank filed the complaint, acknowledgment of service, and consent order and obtained a judgment against
Stamps. Stamps later moved to set aside the consent order, asserting
insufficient service of process.74 The trial court held that Stamps had
waived service of process by executing the acknowledgment of service.75
The acknowledgment of service states:

67.

219 Ga. App. at 738, 466 S.E.2d at 274.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 739, 466 S.E.2d at 274.

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-72 and 9-11-4(c).
Stamps v. Bank South, N.A., 221 Ga. App. 406, 471 S.E.2d 323 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 406, 407, 471 S.E.2d at 324-25.
Id. at 407, 471 S.E.2d at 325.
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I... acknowledge service of the within and foregoing Complaint and
Consent Order attached thereto. I am a resident of Dekalb County and
consent to jurisdiction in Dekalb County for all matters related to this
legal action, even if I were to move out of this County prior to the filing
of this action with the Clerk of the Court.76
The court of appeals held that Stamps did not waive service of summons
in the acknowledgment of service document.7 7
The court first stated that by this document, "Stamps expressly
acknowledged service of the complaint prior to commencement of the
action, which is permissible as long as the waiver of service before
commencement of the action is limited to a specific suit intended by the
parties that is filed without unreasonable delay."78 But, the court
observed that Stamps obviously did not and could not acknowledge
receiving service of the summons which had not yet been issued.7 9
While Stamps could have intended to waive service of summons when
later issued, the acknowledgment did not contain a waiver of service of
summons, or process, or a general waiver of all further service.'
The
court held that a mere acknowledgment of service of the complaint did
not constitute waiver of service of summons as required by O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-4.8'
IV. VENUE
A.

The Vanishing Venue Doctrine

During this survey period, the court of appeals quashed any lingering
doubts about the viability of the vanishing venue doctrine in Georgia
after the case of Carney v. JDN Construction Co.82 In Collipp v.
Newman,' the court reaffirmed the "venerable principle of vanishing
venue ... well established at the turn of the century" 4 that "'[wihere
suit is brought against two defendants, one of whom resides in the
county, the court has no jurisdiction of the nonresident defendant unless

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 409, 471 S.E.2d at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 (1993).
206 Ga. App. 785, 426 S.E.2d 611 (1992).
217 Ga. App. 674, 458 S.E.2d 701 (1995).
Id. at 675, 458 S.E.2d at 701.
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the resident codefendant is liable in the action.'" 8 The vanishing venue
rule provides that when a single suit is brought against several joint
tortfeasors in a county in which one of the defendants is a resident, and
the jury finds that the resident defendant is not liable but the nonresident defendants are liable, jurisdiction as to the nonresident defendants
vanishes, and the court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment against the
nonresident defendants.8 8
The courts have grudgingly made some small concessions to the
harshness of the rule. For instance, the entry of a consent judgment
against the resident defendant will satisfy the requirement that a
judgment be entered against the resident defendant. 7 In Carney v.
JDN Construction Co.,' the court of appeals held that "'[alithough
appellant subsequently settled with [the county resident defendants],
there has been no finding that [the county resident defendants] are not
liable to appellant"' and denial of defendant's motion to transfer was
held proper.8 9
Interpreting these cases, the trial court in Collipp denied the
nonresident defendants' motion to transfer the case from Chatham
County to Wayne County after the plaintiffs settled their claims against
the Chatham County defendants and dismissed those claims with
prejudice. 9 The court of appeals held that this denial was erroneous
and was based on a misinterpretation of Carney.9 The court explained
that in Carney, the resident defendants actually remained parties in the
case: the settlement agreement was reached during the trial, and the
resident defendants were never removed from the case.92 Further, in
Carney, the defendants' dismissal was not a provision of the settlement,
and a jury could have found them liable, unlike the settlement and
dismissal with prejudice in Collipp.93 Therefore, the court of appeals
concluded by emphatically stating that there has been no change in
established venue principles.94

85. Id. (quoting Ross v. Battle, 117 Ga. 877, 880, 45 S.E. 252 (1903)) (emphasis in
original).
86. See Southeastern Truck Lines v. Rann, 214 Ga. 813, 815, 108 S.E.2d 561, 563
(1959).
87. See Motor Convoy v. Brannen, 194 Ga. App. 795,391 S.E.2d 671, affd 260 Ga. 340,
393 S.E.2d 262 (1990).
88. 206 Ga. App. 785, 426 S.E.2d 611 (1992).
89. Id. at 790, 426 S.E.2d at 616.
90. Collip, 217 Ga. App. at 674-75, 458 S.E.2d at 701.
91. Id. at 676, 458 S.E.2d at 702.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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B.

Venue Selection Clause
The court of appeals upheld a contractual venue selection clause in
Brinson v. Martin,95 which was contained in an employment contract
between Brinson and Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society
("Woodmen")."5 The contract in question stated that it would be
construed according to Nebraska laws and that the exclusive venue of
any legal proceeding arising out of the contract would be Douglas
County, Nebraska.9 7 Brinson brought suit in the Superior Court of
Cobb County against Woodmen and four Woodmen employees (collectively "Martin") who are all Georgia residents. Brinson claimed damages for
breach of contract and invasion of privacy against Woodmen, and
interference with economic relations and unjust enrichment against
Martin. 98 The trial court dismissed Brinson's complaint against all
defendants on the basis of improper venue, and Brinson appealed,
claiming that the venue clause was unreasonable, unjust, overreaching,
unenforceable, and violative of Georgia public policy."
Utilizing choice of law principles, the court of appeals determined that
Georgia law would be proper to decide the venue issue. 0 0 Because
contract provisions governing the place of bringing suit are a matter of
procedure, rather than affecting a party's substantive rights, the court
held that the rule of lex fori demands that Georgia law governs the issue
of venue. 101 The court held that this was so despite the fact that under
its own terms the contract was to be construed according to Nebraska
law. ' Under the court's analysis, choice of law provisions in contracts
will not apply to control the remedy and procedure to be applied in the
forum state. 10 3
After deciding this initial matter, the court promptly undermined the
plaintiff's argument that all venue selection clauses are against Georgia
public policy and will not be enforced by Georgia courts.' 4 The court

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

220 Ga. App. 638, 469 S.E.2d 537 (1996).
Id. at 639, 469 S.E.2d at 539.
Id. at 638, 469 S.E.2d at 538.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638-39, 469 S.E.2d at 538.
Id. at 638, 469 S.E.2d at 538. "Under the rule of lex fori, procedural or reme-

dial questions are governed by the law of the forum, the state in which the action is
brought.'" Id. (quoting Lloyd v. Prudential Sec., 211 Ga. App. 247, 248, 438 S.E.2d 703,

704 (1993)).
102. Id. at 638-39, 469 S.E.2d at 538.
103. Id. (citing Lloyd, 211 Ga. App. at 248, 438 S.E.2d at 704).
104. Id. at 639, 469 S.E.2d at 538-39.
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distinguished cases cited by the plaintiff,' stating that those cases
applied to intrastate transactions and dealt with specific state insurance
law that has its own venue provisions.e The court applied the rule
that "where no Georgia law specifically governs venue, and where more
than one state and its citizens are involved, 'such clauses are prima facie
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be "unreasonable" under the circumstances,'" 10 7 and
held that under Georgia law, the venue selection clause was not
unreasonable under the circumstances of the case.10 8
Even more significant is the court's determination of the additional
issue of whether the venue selection clause would apply to defendant
Martin and others for claims of tortious interference with economic
relations and unjust enrichment. These defendants were not signatories
to the contract containing the venue selection clause. The court first
looked to a federal district court decision of the Northern District of
Georgia which held that "because the claims against the other defendants arose directly or indirectly from a single contract connecting the
plaintiffs with all the defendants, the other defendants were transaction
participants entitled to rely on the forum selection clause." 9
Analogizing the instant issue to arbitration clauses, the court reasoned
that the same considerations would apply.' 0 The court stated that
Brinson's claims arose either directly or indirectly from the contract with
Woodmen, and that if defendant Martin were not allowed to rely on the
clause, separate actions in different forums would likely be brought,
possibly yielding varying decisions "inconsistent with the administration
of justice.""' After allowing the nonparties to the contract to rely on
the venue selection clause, the court cautioned that this decision is not
intended to apply to actions filed only against nonsignatories." 2

105. Id. Plaintiff relied on Fidelity Co. of Maryland v. Gainesville Iron Works, 125 Ga.
App. 829, 189 S.E.2d 130 (1972) and Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment,
132 Ga. App. 748, 209 S.E.2d 132 (1974). Id.
106. Brinson, 229 Ga. App. at 639, 469 S.E.2d at 538-39.
107. Id. (quoting Harry S. Peterson Co. v. National Union Co., 209 Ga. App. 585, 434
S.E.2d 778 (1993)).
108. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 539. The court held that the record did not support Brinson's
arguments that he had no notice of the clause or that there was manifest disparity of
bargaining positions. Id.
109. Id. (citing Stephens v. Entre Computer Ctrs., 696 F. Supp. 636, 638-40 (N.D. Ga.
1988)).
110. Id. at 640, 469 S.E.2d at 539-40.
111. Id. at 641, 469 S.E.2d at 540.
112. Id.
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C. Venue over the Georgia Department of Transportation
During this survey period the court of appeals decided a venue issue
involving the D.O.T. In C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Barnett,"3
the court held that the D.O.T was deemed a resident of the county
where it was sued if the cause of action arose in that county.11 4 The
matter to be decided was whether a joint tortfeasor with the D.O.T.
could be sued in the county where the cause of action arose, since the
joint tortfeasor was not a resident of that county." 5 The answer
depended
on whether the D.O.T. was deemed to be a resident of the
6
county.11

Under O.C.G.A. section 32-2-5(b)," 7 all actions against the D.O.T.,
other than ex contractu actions, shall be brought in the county in which
the cause of action arose. The court noted that this situation is similar
to suits against corporations which are to be filed in the county where
the cause of action arose."' Applying the reasoning of Dependable
Insurance Co. v. Gibbs,"9 which creates an implied designation of that
county as the residence of the corporation for the purpose of that suit,
the court of appeals held that O.C.G.A. section 32-2-5(b) also constitutes
an implied designation of the county in which the cause of action arose
as the residence of the D.O.T. for the purpose of that action. 2 ' This
reasoning allowed joinder of the joint tortfeasor who resided in a
different county.

113. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co., Inc. v. Barnett, 219 Ga. App. 763,466 S.E.2d 657
(1996).
114. Id. at 764, 466 S.E.2d at 658.
115. Id. at 763, 466 S.E.2d at 657.
116. Id. at 764, 466 S.E.2d at 658. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. IV (allowing an
action to be maintained against joint tortfeasors who reside in different counties ofGeorgia
in the county of residence of either).

117. O.C.G.A. § 32-2-5(b) (1996).
118. C.W Matthews Contracting Co., 219 Ga. App. at 764, 466 S.E.2d at 658.
119. 218 Ga. 305, 307, 127 S.E.2d 454, 456 (1962).
120. 219 Ga. App. at 764, 466 S.E.2d at 658.
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PROPER PARTIES TO AN ACTION

During this survey period, the cases involving issues of proper parties
to a lawsuit ranged from fetuses"'1 to the deceased.'2 2 Several of the
most interesting cases are highlighted.
Actions for PrenatalInjuries
In two very different cases, both the Supreme Court of Georgia and
Court of Appeals of Georgia were faced with potential parties who
sustained injuries in utero. First, the supreme court, in response to a
question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, held that a fetal victim of a tort must be born alive in order to
seek recovery from the alleged tortfeasor pursuant to O.C.G.A. section
51-1_9.121 In Peters v. HospitalAuthority of Elbert County, Mrs. Peters
delivered a stillborn child, and she and her husband sought to recover
damages for the prenatal injuries allegedly inflicted by the defendants
on the child and for the pain and suffering of the child.2 4 The Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the supreme court: "Can
a parent state a cause of action on behalf of a stillborn child for damages
arising from prenatal injuries to the child? In essence, does a stillborn
a right to recover for injuries sustained while inside the
child have
125
womb?"
Recognizing that Georgia law allows a child born after sustaining a
tortious prenatal injury to bring an action for that injury, the court
nevertheless found that the case law implicitly held that the live birth

A.

of the child was a prerequisite to the child bringing suit. 12' However,

the court noted that the parent is entitled to recover the full value of the
life of the stillborn child.127 The court was required to decide whether
the unborn was a "person" under O.C.G.A. section 51-1-9," which

121. Peters v. Hospital Auth. of Elbert County, 265 Ga. 487,458 S.E.2d 628 (1995), and
Hitachi Chem. Electro-Products, Inc. v. Gurley, 219 Ga. App. 675, 466 S.E.2d 867 (1995).
122. Maddox v. Wilson, 219 Ga. App. 158, 159,464 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1995) ("A deceased
person cannot be a party to legal proceedings."). In this case, a substitution of parties was
not made after a suggestion of death. Id.
123. Peters,265 Ga. at 488, 458 S.E.2d at 630. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-9 states, "Every person
may recover for torts committed to himself, his wife, his child, his ward, or his servant."
124. 265 Ga. 487, 487, 458 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1995).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 488, 458 S.E.2d at 629.
127. Id. (citing Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1995) and Shirley
v. Bacon, 154 Ga. App. 203, 267 S.E.2d 809 (1980)).
128. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-9 (1982).
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authorizes "every person" against whom a tort is committed to recover." The court declined to define a fetus as a person because it was
"reluctant to accord legal rights to the unborn without conditioning those
rights upon live birth.""s The court further held that this holding
does not violate the equal protection clauses of the state and federal
constitution because it is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose-a limitation on who is entitled to bring a tort action is an
attempt13 1to provide solid ground in the quagmire surrounding fetal
injury."

In Hitachi Chemical Electro-Products,Inc. v. Gurley, 3 2 the court of
appeals reaffirmed the principle that a child may sue for injuries
suffered in utero.1 3 In this case, the plaintiffs brought actions alleging
that the birth defects suffered by their children were caused when the
parents were negligently and willfully exposed to hazardous chemicals
while working at the defendant's factory. The defendants sought to
dismiss the claims, asserting that the plaintiffs sought relief for injuries
sustained prior to conception. The court of appeals stated that the
supreme court has previously recognized the existence of a cause of
action to an unconceived child"3 under some situations.1 35 The court
of appeals therefore held that the plaintiffs' allegations sufficiently
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.'
Intervention of a Party
The issue in AC Corp. v. Myree 1 7 was whether a person could
intervene in an action where his motion to allow intervention was not
granted until after the statute of limitations had run. The court of
appeals answered Myree's question affirmatively. The action was
brought initially by Myree's employer, AtlantaStaff, under O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-11.1,13s to recover money it had paid to Myree under the
B.

129. Peters,265 Ga. at 488, 458 S.E.2d at 629.
130. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 629-30.
131. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 630.
132. 219 Ga. App. 675, 466 S.E.2d 867 (1995).
133. Id. at 676, 466 S.E.2d 868 (citing Peters, 265 Ga. 487, 458 S.E.2d 628 (1995)).
134. See McAuley v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3, 303 S.E.2d 258 (1983).
135, Hitachi Chem. Electro-Products,Inc., 219 Ga. App. at 677, 466 S.E.2d at 868.
136. Id. The court also held that the children's claims were not barred by the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act because their claims are not derivative
of any claims that could be asserted by their parents. Id., 466 S.E.2d at 869.
137. 221 Ga. App. 513, 471 S.E.2d 922 (1996).
138. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (1992 & Supp. 1996)
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Workers' Compensation Act.139140 Myree sought to intervene pursuant
to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-24(a).
Both the parties and the court acknowledged that if a party to the suit
had moved to add Myree as a party plaintiff pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-21, the motion would have failed if it had not been granted
prior to the running of the statute of limitation."
"[Fliling a motion
to add a party does not toll the statute of limitation."14 2 However, the
court of appeals held that a motion to intervene is different, and that a
motion to intervene does not necessarily require adherence to the Civil
Practice Act's rules for adding parties.'"
Because an intervenor "takes the case as [he] finds it" and cannot
expand the litigation, but "merely stakes a claim to a share in the result
of the pending litigation," the rules are different than for the initial
parties plaintiff and defendant, and O.C.G.A. sections 9-11-21 and 9-1115 do not apply.'" The court of appeals advised that trial courts
should allow intervention under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-24 as long as the
application to intervene is timely and the intervenors meet the
requirements of 9-11-24.'" Therefore, the court found that Myree
should be allowed to intervene because he fully complied with the
intervention statute before the statute of limitation had expired, even
though the statute of limitation may have barred his independent
claim."
VI.
A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Retroactive Application of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1

One of the most significant series of cases during the survey period
involved the issue of the statute of limitations under the workers'
compensation subrogation statute, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1.147 This
statute was amended by the Georgia General Assembly, eliminating the
one-year limitation period. The amendment to the statute was enacted

139. AC Corp., 221 Ga. App. at 514, 471 S.E.2d at 924.
140. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a) (1993).
141. 221 Ga. App. at 514, 471 S.E.2d at 924.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 515,471 S.E.2d at 924 (citing Gregory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 461,
214 S.E.2d 696 (1975) and Department of Admin. Servs. v. Brown, 219 Ga. App. 27, 464
S.E.2d 7 (1995)).
145. AC Corp., 221 Ga. App. at 515-16, 471 S.E.2d at 925.
146. Id.
147. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (1992 & Supp. 1996)
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on April 18, 1995 and took effect on July 1, 1995. The new statute
provides in relevant part that:
(c) Such action against such other person by the employee must be
instituted in all cases within the applicable statute of limitations. If
such action is not brought by the employee within one year after the
date of injury, then the employer or such employer's insurer may but
is not required to assert the employee's cause of action in tort, either
in its own name or in the name of the employee. The employer or its
insurer shall immediately notify the employee of its assertion of such
cause of action, and the employee shall have a right to intervene ....
(e) It is the express intent of the General Assembly that the
provisions of subsection (c) of this Code section be applied not only
prospectively but also retroactively to injuries occurring on or after
July 1, 1992.148
In Vaughn v. Vulcan Materials Co., 49 an employee of a trucking
company suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury at the
defendant's ("Vulcan") quarry on December 16, 1992. One year and
eight months later, on August 18, 1994, Vaughn brought a negligence
action against Vulcan. The trial court, on April 11, 1995, granted
summary judgment to the defendant and dismissed the lawsuit based on
the one-year statute of limitation in the workers' compensation
statute.5 0 On April 19, 1995, the day after the statute was amended,
Vaughn filed an emergency motion to vacate the judgment because the
general assembly had amended the statute, thereby eliminating the oneyear statute of limitation.'
The statute provides that the revision applies retroactively to all
injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1992.152 The Georgia Supreme
Court held that the trial court's denial of Vaughn's emergency motion to
vacate the judgment was erroneous in light of the recent amendment of
the statute.5 3 The court noted that the reviewing court applies the
law that exists at the time of its judgment, rather than the law
prevailing at the time of the judgment under review.5 4 The reviewing
court may thus reverse a judgment that was correct when it was
rendered, or affirm a judgment that was erroneous at the time it was
rendered, when the law has been, changed in the meantime and where

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Vaughn v. Vulcan Materials Co., 266 Ga. 163, 465 S.E.2d 661 (1996).
Id. at 163, 465 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 163-64,'465 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 164, 465 S.E.2d at 662. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(e).
Vaughn, 266 Ga. at 164, 465 S.E.2d at 662.
Id.
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the application of the new law will not impair a vested right under the
prior law. 5'
The court decided that reinstatement of Vaughn's claim was proper,
stating that there is no vested right in a statute of limitation and that
the legislature may revive a claim that would have been previously
barred by a limitation period without violating the constitutional
Because Vaughn's injury
prohibition against retroactive laws.15
occurred after July 1, 1992, he was permitted under the amended statute
to bring his action under the applicable statute of limitation of two
years.
Five opinions by the court of appeals follow the identical reasoning of
the supreme court in reinstating claims under the newly amended
statute.5 7 The court of appeals utilized the same analysis as the
supreme court to decide that the plaintiffs' claims in each case should be
reinstated. The defendants in three of the cases sought to attack the
court's holdings that retroactive application of the statute would not
The hallmark of these cases is the
impair any vested rights.'
analysis in Moore v. Savannah Cocoa, Inc.,"59 in which the court of
appeals held that the defendant had no vested right in -a statute of
limitation or in a statutory assignment of a right contained in the former
statute."6
The appellate courts may reverse a judgment that was correct at the
time it was rendered, but which is incorrect due to a change in the law
when the reviewing court makes its judgment, but only if the application
of the new law will not impair a vested right under the prior law.1 6'
Therefore, the defendant in Moore argued that it had a vested right in
the one-year statute of limitation contained in the former O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-11.1. The court of appeals disagreed, pointing out that:

155. Id. (citing City of Valdosta v. Singleton, 197 Ga. 194, 208, 28 S.E.2d 759 (1944)).

156. Id. (citing Canton Textile Mills v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102, 105, 317 S.E.2d 198
(1994)).
157. Moore v. Savannah Cocoa, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 869,459 S.E.2d 580 (1995); Draughn
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 540, 462 S.E.2d 445 (1995); Conner v. Greene, 219 Ga.
App. 860, 467 S.E.2d 199 (1996); Wilson v. Christian, 220 Ga. App. 221, 469 S.E.2d 362
(1996); and Dowdy v. Earthwise Restaurant Mgmt., Inc., 221 Ga. App. 220, 471 S.E.2d 42
(1996).
158. See Moore v. Savannah Cocoa, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 869, 459 S.E.2d 580 (1995);
Wilson v. Christian, 220 Ga. App. 221, 469 S.E.2d 362 (1996); and Dowdy v. Earthwise
Restaurant Mgmnt., Inc., 221 Ga. App. 220, 471 S.E.2d 42 (1996).
159. 217 Ga. App. 869, 459 S.E.2d 580 (1995).
160. Id. at 871, 459 S.E.2d at 582.
161. Id. at 870-71, 459 S.E.2d at 582.
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[s]tatutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic .... They represent a public policy about
the privilege to litigate. Their shelter has never been regarded as what
now is called a "fundamental" right or what used to be called a
"natural" right of the individual. He may, of course, have the
protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas of
limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace
and to be
162
subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.
Next, the defendant sought to argue that it had a vested right in the
assignment of the employee's claim to his employer and insurance
carrier."
Again, the court of appeals disagreed, maintaining that
while a prior contractual assignment may create vested rights in an
assignee, the assignment in this case was a statutory remedy which the
legislature could change."
Therefore, the court held that no vested
right existed in the assignment.'6
The court of appeals also summarily dismissed this same argument in
Dowdy v. Earthwise Restaurant Management,' 66 holding that the
assignment was statutory and not a vested right.167 Here, the defendants sought to add a new spin to their argument, stating that the
employee's claim was assigned to her employer by the former statute,
and was never reassigned to her after the amendment to the statute.
The court of appeals rejected that argument because the amended
statute clearly and specifically provides for the retroactive application of
subsection (c), which deletes the language concerning assignment of
actions. 6 '
Finally, the court of appeals also addressed these issues in Draughn
0 9
v. Delta Airlines, Inc."
The factual scenario is much the same as the
previous cases: Draughn was injured in 1992, received workers'
compensation benefits, and filed an action against Delta in 1994. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant based on the
former one-year statute of limitation. 7 ° The court of appeals again

162. Id. at 871, 459 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Canton Textile Mills v. Lathem, 253 Ga.
102, 105, 317 S.E.2d 189 (1984)).
163. Moore, 217 Ga. App. at 871, 459 S.E.2d at 582. The court pointed out the irony
of the defendant claiming a vested right in the assignment when the employer and insurer,
the actual assignees, did not even assert the claim. Id. at 871 n.1, 459 S.E.2d at 582 n.1.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 221 Ga. App. 220, 471 S.E.2d 42 (1996).
167. Id. at 224, 471 S.E.2d at 46.
168. Id. at 223, 471 S.E.2d at 45.
169. 218 Ga. App. 540, 462 S.E.2d 445 (1995).
170. Id. at 540, 462 S.E.2d at 445.
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utilized the analysis that the legislative amendment applied retroactively so that Draughn's claim was reinstated because it was filed within
two years of the incident. 7 ' This case, however, is slightly different,
in that Draughn's injury occurred on March 28, 1992. The amended
statute, by its language, applies retroactively to injuries occurring on or
after July 1, 1992.172
The court did not determine these dates to be a problem in reinstating
Draughn's claim. The court first pointed out that the effective date of
the former O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1 was July 1, 1992. Thus, the court
found that the "General Assembly's decision not to extend the retroactive
application of the amended statute in subsection (e) to claims arising
before that date is an expression of its intention that the former statute
was not applicable to injuries occurring prior to July 1, 1992. "' 73
Therefore, the court applied the law as it existed at its judgment and
74
held that Draughn timely filed his claim under the amended statute.'
B.

Medical MalpracticeActions

Medical malpractice actions are governed by O.C.G.A. section 9-371(a),175 which requires medical malpractice actions to be brought
within two years after the date of the injury arising from a negligent or
wrongful act. The case law in Georgia dealing with the statute of
limitations when the negligent act involves a misdiagnosis is conflicting.
The courts are apparently in disagreement as to whether the date the
misdiagnosis is made is the injury which starts the statute of limitations
running, or whether the date the consequence of the misdiagnosis
becomes apparent to the plaintiff starts it running. Two cases decided
during this survey period demonstrate the conflict.
In Ford v.Dove,' 6 the administratrix of the deceased brought a
medical malpractice action against the defendant, asserting that the
defendant misdiagnosed the deceased's kidney cancer.'77 The expert's
affidavit stated that the defendant was negligent on March 6, 1989, in
failing to take an x-ray of Mr. Dove's kidney to rule out cancer in light
of other symptoms. The expert also stated that the defendant was
further negligent in failing to perform follow-up urinalysis for two years

Id. at 541, 462 S.E.2d at 446.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (1982 & Supp. 1996).
173. Draughn, 218 Ga. App. at 540, 462 S.E.2d at 445.
174. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 446.
175. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a) (1982 & Supp. 1996).
176. 218 Ga. App. 828, 463 S.E.2d 351 (1995).
177. Id. at 828, 463 S.E.2d at 353.
171.

172.
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after blood was first noted in Mr. Dove's urine. 7 ' The deceased's
kidney cancer was ultimately diagnosed on March 9, 1991, and the
plaintiff's claim was filed on March 5, 1993.79 The trial court denied
the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment based on the twoyear statute of limitation.8
The court of appeals began its analysis with the rule that "'[ilnitiating
the period of limitation in a medical malpractice action when the alleged
negligence is first discovered would be contrary to the plain language of
§§ 9-3-71 and 9-3-73.'"'81

The court then set forth the general rule

regarding misdiagnosis cases: "[Tihe injury begins immediately upon
the misdiagnosis due to the pain, suffering, or economic loss sustained
by the patient from the time of the misdiagnosis until the medical
problem is properly diagnosed and treated. The misdiagnosis itself is
the injury and not the subsequent discovery of the proper diagnosis."8 2
According to the court, the fact that a patient does not know the medical
cause of the suffering does not affect the applicability of O.C.G.A. section
9-3-71(a)."

The court apparently disagrees with the exception to the rule which
it cites in Whitaker v. Zirkle."' In Whitaker, the defendant misdiagnosed the presence of cancer in a mole on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
manifested no additional symptoms for seven years after the initial
misdiagnosis. Shortly after symptoms manifested themselves, the cancer
was properly diagnosed and metastasis had occurred.'
The court in
Whitaker held that the injury the plaintiff was alleging was not that the
misdiagnosis caused the cancer, but that the cancerous cells subsequently metastasized, and this subsequent metastasis would not have occurred
if the cancer had been properly diagnosed and treated at the time of the
original biopsy." "When an injury occurs subsequent to the date of
medical treatment, the statute
of limitation commences from the date
87
the injury is discovered."1

While the court in Ford criticized the Whitaker decision as a deviation
from the plain language of the statute, it decided not to resolve the

178.
179.
180.
181.
S.E.2d
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 829, 463 S.E.2d at 353.
Id. at 828, 831, 463 S.E.2d at 354.
Id. at 828-29, 463 S.E.2d at 353.
Id. at 830, 463 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting Crowe v. Humana, 263 Ga. 833, 834, 439
654, 655 (1994)).
Id. (quoting Frankel v. Clark, 213 Ga. App. 222, 223,444 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1993)).
Id. at 831, 463 S.E.2d at 354.
188 Ga. App. 706, 374 S.E.2d 106 (1988).
Id. at 706, 374 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 708, 374 S.E.2d at 108.
Id.
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discrepancy because it opined that Whitaker is factually distinguishable."'8 First, the court found that the plaintiff's expert contradicted
himself in his affidavit and a deposition. 8 9 The expert stated in his
affidavit that the defendant's negligence caused Mr. Dove to die "as a
result of a metastasized cancerous left kidney tumor which could have
been removed without complications" if a timely diagnosis had been
made.' 9° At a subsequent deposition, the expert admitted that he
could not assess the size and extent of the tumor when the misdiagnosis
was made, there was no way to assess the size of the cancer in 1989
when Mr. Dove had an abnormal urinalysis, and he did not know if
there was any nodal involvement or distant seeding of the tumor at that
time. ' 91 The court of appeals found this testimony to contradict the
expert's opinion in the affidavit that Mr. Dove's cancer had not
metastasized and was curable in March of 1989."9 The court reasoned
that under Whitaker, there would have to be viable evidence that the
tumor had not metastasized at the time of the misdiagnosis. 9 3
Second, the court distinguished Whitaker on the basis of the time lapse
between the initial misdiagnosis and the manifestation of further
symptoms. 94 In Whitaker, the plaintiff suffered no further symptoms
In contrast, the
until nearly seven years after the misdiagnosis."'
court found that the deceased's injury physically manifested itself at
least four months prior to the proper diagnosis, which was made on
March 9, 1991, placing the date of injury at approximately November of
1990. Since the suit was not filed until March 5, 1993, it was filed more
than two years after November of 1990.196 The court decided that the
deceased's subjective belief that his pain stemmed from something other
than the misdiagnosed kidney cancer did not matter and did not change
the date of his injury.197

9 another panel of
Fortunately for the plaintiff in Staples v. Bhatti,"'
the court of appeals analyzed a similar issue, but reached a different
result. In Staples, the plaintiff underwent a mammography on June 1,

188.
189.

Ford, 218 Ga. App. at 831, 463 S.E.2d at 354.
Id. at 829, 463 S.E.2d at 353.

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193.
194.

Id. at 831, 463 S.E.2d at 354.
Id.

195. Whitaker, 188 Ga. App. at 706, 374 S.E.2d at 107.
196. Ford, 218 Ga. App. at 831, 463 S.E.2d at 354.
197. Id. at 831, 463 S.E.2d at 354-55 (citing Henry v. Medical Ctr., 216 Ga. App. 893,
894, 456 S.E.2d 216 (1995)).
198. 220 Ga. App. 404, 469 S.E.2d 490 (1996).
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1989. Staples went for a follow-up with her physician, Bhatti, the next
day on June 2, 1989, and Bhatti told her that she had not received the
results of the mammogram. Although Bhatti subsequently received the
results which indicated the possibility of cancer, she did not inform
Staples of those results.'
Approximately three years later, in March
of 1992, Staples discovered a lump in her breast and had another
mammogram performed in April of 1992 which revealed a mass located
in the same spot as where the calcifications were noted in 1989. Staples
was forced to undergo a modified radical mastectomy on April 14, 1992.
Staples brought suit on April 1, 1993.20 The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the suit
was barred by the two-year statute of limitation of O.C.G.A. section 9-371.201

Unlike the court in Ford,the court of appeals in Staples held that "the
focus of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a) is not on the date of the negligent act but
the consequence of the defendant's acts on the plaintiff."2 2 However,
the court proceeded to analyze the facts in much the same manner as
the court in Ford. The court pointed out that the injury occurred, not on
the date of misdiagnosis, but on the date when the small cancer present
in 1989 was allowed to grow and spread to Staples' lymph node,
increasing the risk that the cancer would metastasize and prove fatal to
Staples.20 3 Since the precise date could not be pinpointed, the court
looked to the date when the plaintiff began experiencing symptoms.
Since the suit was filed nearly one year after that date, it was well
within the two-year statute of limitations.2 4
The flaw in the court's analysis is the failure to take into account the
practical reality that patients trust and rely on their physicians. Until
a proper diagnosis is made, a patient should be able reasonably to rely
on his or her doctor's opinions and will not necessarily seek other
diagnoses. Under these decisions, such reliance can be the eventual
downfall of the misdiagnosed patient by beginning the running of the
statute of limitations well before the patient discovers the correct
diagnosis. As a matter of logic and policy, such a result tends to

199. Id. at 404-05, 469 S.E.2d at 490-91.
200. Id. at 405, 469 S.E.2d at 491.
201. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 (Supp. 1996) ("(a) Except as otherwise provided in this
article, an action for medical malpractice shall be brought within 2 years after the date on
which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.").
202. 220 Ga. App. at 405,469 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting Vitner v. Miller, 208 Ga. App. 306,
430 S.E.2d 671 (1993)).
203. Id. at 405-06, 469 S.E.2d at 491.
204. Id. at 406, 469 S.E.2d at 491.

1996]

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

541

encourage distrust in personal physicians and fosters the repeated
opportunity for injustice by allowing wrongs to go without a remedy.
VII.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE AFFIDAVIT REQUIREMENT

The malpractice affidavit requirement of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1
attempts to set forth the proper form and content of an expert affidavit
to be attached to any complaint alleging professional malpractice." 5
The claim will be dismissed if the requirements of this statute are not
met.2 This statute has been fertile ground for litigation.
A.

Forty-five-day Extension for Filing the Affidavit

One of the more disputed issues during this survey period in regard
to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 would seem to be the automatic forty-fiveday extension for filing the affidavit when the complaint is filed within
ten days of the running of the statute of limitation.2 7 The case of
Works v. Aupont °s demonstrates the divisiveness caused by this
subsection of the statute. O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b) provides:
The contemporaneous filing requirement of subsection (a) of this Code
section shall not apply to any case in which the period of limitation will
expire within ten days of the date of filing and, because of such time
constraints, the plaintiff has alleged that an affidavit of an expert could
not be prepared. In such cases, the plaintiff shall have 45 days after
the filing of the complaint to supplement the pleadings with the
affidavit. The trial court may, on motion, after hearing and for good
cause extend such time as it shall determine justice requires. 20 9
The question addressed in Works was whether the plaintiff mustprove
that time constraints prevented the filing of the affidavit with the
complaint when the defendant challenges the allegation that time
constraints prevented the filing of the affidavit.210
In Works, the
plaintiff followed the procedures of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9. 1(b): she filed
the complaint within ten days of the expiration of the statute of
limitations, and she invoked the automatic forty-five-day extension
alleging that "the statute of limitations will expire within ten (10) days

205. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 9-11-9.1(b).
208. 219 Ga. App. 577, 465 S.E.2d 717 (1995). In this opinion written by Presiding
Judge McMurray, two judges concurred, one concurred specially, two concurred in the
judgment only, and three dissented.
209. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b).
210. Works, 219 Ga. App. at 578, 465 S.E.2d at 718.
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of the filing of this complaint and because of such time restraints an
expert affidavit concerning the Defendant Doctors could not be prepared
for filing with the complaint."21' Five days later, she filed the expert
affidavit. The trial court, on the defendants' motion, rejected the
plaintiff's allegation that time constraints prevented her from filing the
affidavit contemporaneously with the complaint and dismissed the
complaint.2 12 The court of appeals pointed out that the trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint "because [it] did not believe plaintiffs'
allegation that 'time constraints' prevented compliance" with the
statute.1 3
The court of appeals reversed, holding that O.C.G.A. section 9-119. 1(b) unambiguously provides for an automatic forty-five-day extension
for filing the affidavit in any case in which the statute of limitations will
expire within ten days of the date of filing and, because of time
constraints, the plaintiff alleges that an affidavit cannot be prepared. 214 The court of appeals stated unequivocally that "[ilf these two
conditions are met, it does not matter whether the trial court believes or
disbelieves a plaintiffs allegation that 'time constraints' prevented
compliance with the contemporaneous filing requirement of O.C.G.A. § 911-9.1(a)."215 Only if the plaintiff wishes an extension beyond the
forty-five-day period must a hearing
be had to determine whether good
216
cause exists for further delay.

Chief Judge Beasley's special concurrence points out the rigidity of the
statute and the inordinately detailed nature of the exceptions to the rule
which rob the judiciary of the ability to tailor general standards in its
wisdom and discretion." 7 Chief Judge Beasley did not agree with the
majority that the plaintiff cannot be called on to show the existence of
the two requirements for an automatic extension. Chief Judge Beasley
acknowledged that such a procedure would invite a "mini-trial," in that
the parties and court would go on a fact-finding journey at the outset of
the proceedings if the defendants demanded it in order to determine
whether the plaintiffs truly could not have the affidavit prepared and on
hand to file it with the complaint. 2" However, Chief Judge Beasley
does distinguish the requirement of a good faith explanation for the

211.

Id. at 577, 465 S.E.2d at 718.

212. Id.
213. Id. at 578, 465 S.E.2d at 718.
214. Id.
215. Id., 465 S.E.2d at 718-19.
216. Id., 465 S.E.2d at 719 (citing Piedmont Hosp. v. Draper, 205 Ga. App. 160, 161,
421 S.E.2d 543 (1992)).

217. Id. at 579, 465 S.E.2d at 719-20 (Beasley, C.J., concurring specially).
218.

Id. at 580, 465 S.E.2d at 720 (Beasley, C.J., concurring specially).
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unavailability of the affidavit from the requirement of "good cause"
necessary for a further extension.219
In a dissent, Judge Andrews rather scathingly opines that the
majority's construction of the statute renders its provisions meaningless. 220 Judge Andrews stated in his dissent that although the statute

does mandate an extension when the statutory requisites are met, he
"reject[sI 1 the premise that those requisites may be satisfied through
22
deceit."

In Keefe v. Northside Hospital, Inc.,22 which also involved the fortyfive-day extension, the court of appeals restrictively interpreted the issue
of whether the plaintiff must expressly allege that because of time
constraints the affidavit could not be prepared.2 s In Keefe, the
plaintiffs stated in their complaint that "pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1,
the Plaintiffs are filing this cause of action within ten (10) days of the
statute of limitations, and the Plaintiffs by law shall supplement and
amend to this Complaint within forty-five (45) days a pertinent affidavit
of an expert ....

.

224

Due to this language, the defendant argued that

the plaintiff had failed to properly invoke the forty-five-day extension of
time under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b). The plaintiffs contended,
however, that they had put the defendant on notice that they were
invoking their automatic right to an extension and had therefore met the
requirements of the statute.225
The court of appeals agreed with the defendants, holding that the
allegation of time constraints may not be merely implied, but must be
expressly stated.226 Referring to its decision in Works v. Aupont,227
the court noted that the language required in the complaint is not mere
verbiage, but a representation of a fact which is not subject to challenge
by either the defendant or the trial court. 22" Because the language of
the plaintiff's complaint is conclusively presumed to be true, and the
trial court must rely on its truthfulness, the language required by the

219. Id. at 582, 465 S.E.2d at 721 (Beasley, C.J., concurring specially).
220.

Id. (Andrews, J., dissenting).

221. Id. at 583, 465 S.E.2d at 722 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
222.
223.

219 Ga. App. 875, 467 S.E.2d 9 (1996).
Id. at 875, 467 S.E.2d at 9.

224. Id.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 875-76, 467 S.E.2d at 10.
Id. at 877, 467 S.E.2d at 10.
219 Ga. App. 577, 465 S.E.2d 717 (1995).
Keefe, 219 Ga. App. at 876, 467 S.E.2d at 10.
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statute plays an important role, and the court was compelled to hold
that the language must be expressly stated in the complaint. 2
A final issue involving the forty-five-day extension period pertained to
the time in which the defendant has to answer the complaint when the
plaintiff invokes the forty-five-day extension. The case of McGarr v.
Gilmore"3 involved multiple defendants, including corporate roadway
contractors, the Georgia Department of Transportation ("D.O.T."), and
employees of the D.O.T.25 ' The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
were negligent in the placement of warning or protective devices, and
the plaintiff, in his complaint, invoked the forty-five-day extension to file
an expert affidavit.232 After one trip to the court of appeals to determine that the defendants had thirty days after the filing of the expert
affidavit in which to file their answers,233 the plaintiff again sought a
default judgment against the D.O.T. employees, arguing that evidence
acquired after the appeal showed that the employees were not professional engineers, so the forty-five-day extension did not apply to
them. 4
The court of appeals squarely rejected this argument. 23 ' The
plaintiff's actions in invoking the forty-five-day extension, and in
relating the affidavit in general allegations of negligence to all the
defendants, automatically gave all defendants the same time period in
which to respond to the complaint.2 6 In essence, it was the plaintiff's
fault in not distinguishing between professionals and nonprofessionals
in his complaint. The court noted that the plaintiff's dilemma in having
to determine at the complaint stage, before discovery, which defendants
are "professionals" will only arise when the plaintiff does not file an
affidavit contemporaneously with the complaint.3 7 In the ordinary
course of events, where the complaint is filed with more than ten days
remaining to the statute of limitation, all defendants will have thirty
days from the date of service to answer.23 8

229. Id. at 877, 467 S.E.2d at 10. The court did imply that a less strict standard may
apply to pro se cases. Id., 467 S.E.2d at 10-11.
230. 220 Ga. App. 286, 469 S.E.2d 720 (1996).
231. Id. at 286, 469 S.E.2d at 721.
232. Id.
233. Department of Transp. v. Gilmore, 209 Ga. App. 656, 434 S.E.2d 114 (1993).
234. McGarr,220 Ga. App. at 287, 469 S.E.2d at 721.
235. Id. at 287-88, 469' S.E.2d at 722.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 288, 469 S.E.2d at 722.
238. Id.
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B. CollateralEstoppel After Dismissal Based on an Insufficient
Affidavit
In last year's survey article,2"' the authors of this survey discussed
the court of appeals decision in Greene County Hospital Authority v.
Waldroup,2" holding that a claim for wrongful death would be barred
by collateral estoppel if it was asserted after a claim for personal injury,
based on the same injuries, was dismissed due to the lack of an expert
affidavit.24 1 Shortly after last year's survey period was over, the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed this decision of the court of appeals in
Waldroup v. Greene County Hospital Authority,2 42 utilizing the same
analysis employed in last year's survey article.
In Waldroup, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action for
personal injuries against the defendants, but failed to attach sufficient
expert affidavits to the complaint. The trial court dismissed the
complaint as to the defendant hospital.2' Subsequently, the plaintiff's
husband died of his injuries, and the trial court allowed the plaintiff to
amend her complaint to re-instate the hospital as a defendant. 2" The
amended complaint reasserted the personal injury claims and added a
new claim for wrongful death.24
The court of appeals held that
Waldroup's personal injury claim was barred by res judicata and her
wrongful death claim was barred by collateral estoppel. 2"
While the supreme court agreed that the plaintiff's personal injury
action would be barred by res judicata,247 the court did not agree that
the plaintiff's wrongful death action would be barred by collateral estoppel. 2" The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the litigation of an
issue that has previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits
in another action between the same parties.249 Collateral estoppel only

239. C. Frederick Overby & Jason Crawford, Trial Practiceand Procedure, 47 MERCER
L. REV. 353, 365-68 (1995).

240. 215 Ga. App. 344, 451 S.E.2d 62 (1994).
241. Id. at 345, 451 S.E.2d at 64.
242. 265 Ga. 864, 463 S.E.2d 5 (1995).
243. Id. at 865, 463 S.E.2d at 6.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Greene County Hosp. Auth., 215 Ga. App. at 348, 451 S.E.2d at 66.
247. Waldroup, 265 Ga. at 866, 463 S.E.2d at 7. The court held that the 3 requirements of res judicata had been satisfied: (1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of
the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Id.
248. Id. at 868, 463 S.E.2d at 8.
249. Id. at 866-67, 463 S.E.2d at 7.
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precludes the issues that were actually litigated in the prior action.'
The supreme court held that while a dismissal for failure to comply with
the affidavit requirement of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 is an adjudication
on the merits for purposes of res judicata, it is not an actual litigation
of an issue for purposes of collateral estoppel."' The court found that
the plaintiff's actions were not actually litigated and decided when her
first action was dismissed; the only issue that was decided when the first
action was dismissed was that the plaintiff had failed to state a personal
injury cause of action due to her failure to satisfy the expert affidavit
requirement.25 2 Even though that ruling was "on the merits," it did
not decide or litigate the claims.253
C. Filing of the Expert Affidavit by Facsimile
Roberts v. Faust254 and Allen v. Caldwell 5 involve two cases
where the expert affidavit was sought to be filed by facsimile. Previous256 the court held that a plaintiff should be allowed
ly, in Sisk v. Patel,
to file a facsimile of a properly executed affidavit with a complaint in
order to avoid the expiration of the statute of limitations, with the
original being filed as a supplemental pleading." 7
In Roberts, the plaintiffs invoked the forty-five day extension for filing
an expert affidavit, and they subsequently received two additional
extensions from the trial court."' On the last day of their extension,
the plaintiffs filed a facsimile of their expert affidavit. Two weeks later,
they filed the original affidavit. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs
failed to show that the original was in the physical possession of the
plaintiffs before they filed the facsimile. To the contrary, the court of
appeals held that an original affidavit does not have to be in the
plaintiff's physical possession in order for it to be considered "available."2 9 The court of appeals determined that the trial court did not
err in considering the facsimile of the affidavit or in allowing the
plaintiffs to supplement their complaint with the original affidavit." °

250. Id. at 867, 463 S.E.2d at 7.
251. Id. at 868, 463 S.E.2d at 6-7.
252. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 8.
253. Id.
254. 217 Ga. App. 787, 459 S.E.2d 448 (1995).
255. 221 Ga. App. 54, 470 S.E.2d 696 (1996).
256. 217 Ga. App. 156, 456 S.E.2d 718 (1995).
257. Id. at 159, 456 S.E.2d at 720.
258. Roberts, 217 Ga. App. at 787, 459 S.E.2d at 449.
259. Id. at 788, 459 S.E.2d at 449.
260. Id. at 789, 459 S.E.2d at 450. In a special concurrence by Chief Judge Beasley,
she again laments the detailed and precise nature of this statute which yields little
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Allen u. Caldwell26' involved an affidavit sent by facsimile to the
plaintiffs' attorney, but which was unnotarized.5 2 The plaintiffs
attached a copy of the unnotarized, faxed affidavit to their renewal
complaint in a medical malpractice action.
The absence of a valid notary seal was fatal to the plaintiffs' submitted
affidavit.2' "While a facsimile affidavit can satisfy the requirements
of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1,... 'in the absence of a valid jurat, a writing in
the form of an affidavit has no force, no validity, amounts to nothing,
when standing alone, or when construed in connection with other evidence."' 2 " The court held that this affidavit did not satisfy the
statutory requirements. 2"
Furthermore, in a five to four decision, the majority of the court held
that an affidavit previously filed in the plaintiffs' original action would
not suffice to satisfy the affidavit required in the renewal action. 2"
Even though the renewed complaint incorporated the original pleadings
by reference, the majority of the court found that a statement in the
renewed complaint that the required affidavit was attached specifically
negated the inference that the original affidavit was incorporated by
reference. 7 The majority also pointed out that the facsimile and the
supposed original of the facsimile differed.2
The dissent in Allen agreed with the majority that the unnotarized
affidavit was not an affidavit within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section 911-9.1; however, the dissent would hold that the affidavit requirement
was satisfied because there was a proper affidavit in the record
informing the defendant of the negligence alleged on his part.26
In Redmond v. Shook 2 ' 0 another case involving expert affidavits, the
court of appeals held that "'[]ong-distance swearing is not permissible.'"271 In Redmond, the expert affidavit was signed by the expert in
Pennsylvania and notarized by the notary public in Georgia, and the

discretion to trial judges to accommodate peculiar circumstances such as faxed documents.
Id. at 790, 459 S.E.2d at 450 (Beasley, C.J., concurring specially).
261. 221 Ga. App. 54, 470 S.E.2d 696 (1996).
262. Id. at 54-55, 470 S.E.2d at 697.
263. Id. at 55, 470 S.E.2d at 697.
264. Id. (quoting Harvey v. Kidney Ctr. of Cent. Ga., 213 Ga. App. 319,320,444 S.E.2d
590 (1994); Hill-Everett v. Jones, 197 Ga. App. 872, 873, 399 S.E.2d 739 (1990)).
265. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 698.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 56, 470 S.E.2d at 698 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
270. 218 Ga. App. 477, 462 S.E.2d 172 (1995).
271. Id. at 477, 462 S.E.2d at 173 (quoting Carnes v. Carnes, 138 Ga. 1, 6, 74 S.E. 785
(1912)).

548

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

oath was administered by the notary to the expert over the telephone. 2 Citing a case from 1912, the court of appeals held that an
oath cannot be administered over the telephone in Georgia.27 Therefore, the plaintiff's expert affidavit was invalid. The court of appeals, in
this case, declined to liberally construe the pleadings so as to do
substantial justice.274
In many of these cases, the courts harken back to the words of Sisk v.
to repeal this ungainly,
Patel,275 in a constant plea to the legislature
278
unworkable, and unforgiving statute:
[Tihe history of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 in the appellate courts has shown

beyond a reasonable doubt that it is only with great difficulty made
workable in the practical arena of litigation, and has largely failed to
achieve its purpose of reducing frivolous litigation. Rather, it has
created an added layer of motions regarding the sufficiency of affidavits
preceding the motions for summary judgment on the merits. Rather
than continuing to interpret and reconcile subsection after subsection
added to the statute by the legislature in attempts to fix what is
fundamentally broken, the better approach is to construe pleadings
liberally to do substantial justice in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-118(f).277

VIII.

RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The requirements for res judicata and collateral estoppel are fairly
well established in Georgia. O.C.G.A. section 9-12-40 provides:
A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive
between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in
issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in
the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is
reversed or set aside. 78

Three requirements must be met for res judicata to apply: (1) identity
of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3)

272. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 172.
273. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 173.
274. Id. at 478, 462 S.E.2d at 173.
275. 217 Ga. App. 156, 456 S.E.2d 718 (1995).
276. See, e.g., Works v. Aupont, 219 Ga. App. 577, 577-78, 465 S.E.2d 717, 718 (1995)
("In Sisk .. ., a majority of this Court recently recognized that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1
has done more to spawn wasteful litigation than to 'achieve its purpose of reducing
frivolous litigation.'"). (citation omitted).
277. Allen, 221 Ga. App. at 56-57,470 S.E.2d at 699 (Blackburn, J., dissenting) (quoting
Sisk, 217 Ga. App. at 159-60, 456 S.E.2d at 720).
278. O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (1982).
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previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.279 Similarly, collateral estoppel requires identity of the parties,
but not identity of the claim. For collateral estoppel to apply, the same
issue must have been actually litigated and decided in a previous

action. 8 0
A

Res Judicata

The Georgia Supreme Court decided the case of Stone Man, Inc. v.
Green,2 8 1 which involved the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
The issue was whether an equitable suit in the first action barred a
damages suit in a subsequent action. The supreme court held that res
In their first action for equitable relief, the
judicata applied. 2
plaintiffs sought to have the defendant's quarry closed because it
constituted a nuisance. The jury found that the quarry was a nuisance,
but the trial court granted only a partial injunction in which it imposed
certain restrictions on the continued operation of the quarry.2s
Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought a second action, but this time for
damages resulting from the defendant's operation of his quarry. The
defendant moved to dismiss based on res judicata, but the trial court
denied the motion.2 s4
The supreme court held that the difference between a suit in equity
and a suit for damages will not preclude the application of res judicata
or collateral estoppel if the issues are identical. 2" The supreme court
found that the trial court's identification of specific aspects of the
operation constituting a nuisance and fashioning remedies to address
those aspects was a "final judicial determination that operation of the
quarry in accordance with the imposed limitations does not constitute an
actionable nuisance."2" Therefore, since the issue in both cases was
whether the quarry constituted a nuisance, the court found that the
litigation of this issue in the second action for damages was barred by
res judicata.5 7 The court did hold, however, that the plaintiffs could

279. Waldroup, 265 Ga. 864, 866, 463 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1995).
280. Id. at 866-67, 463 S.E.2d at 7. For a discussion of collateral estoppel involving the
malpractice affidavit requirement, see Section VI, supra.
281. 265 Ga. 877, 463 S.E.2d 1 (1995).
282.

Id. at 878, 463 S.E.2d at 2.

283. Id. at 877, 463 S.E.2d at 1.
284.

Id. at 878, 463 S.E.2d at 1.

285. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 1-2.
286. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 2.
287. Id.
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assert a claim for any violations of the partial injunction or seek a
modification of its terms on proof of changed circumstances. 2
The dissent, authored by Justice Sears, took issue with an apparent
discrepancy in the majority's opinion.2" Although the majority ruled
that the trial court's partial injunction was a final judgment that the
operation of the quarry in accordance with the limitations was not a
nuisance, the majority went on to hold that the plaintiffs could seek a
modification of the injunction on showing a change in condition. °
The dissent pointed out that any modification would have to be
predicated on a finding that the quarry continued to be a nuisance, in
contradiction to the court's finding of a final judgment that the quarry
is no longer a nuisance.29 1 Justice Sears wrote that, as a matter of
policy, it is unwise to give res judicata effect to injunctions such as the
one issued by the trial court due to the uncertain nature of whether the
injunction will remedy the evil it seeks to redress. 21 The dissent
further stated that:
UlIf the court knows that such an injunction will be given res judicata
effect if the restrictions on the business fail to alleviate the damage,
the court may instead issue an injunction closing the business. We
should not discourage trial courts from seeking practical, economic
solutions to today's difficult problems.9 3
B.

CollateralEstoppel
During the current survey period, several cases of interest occurred in
the area of collateral estoppel.'
The question of whether the issues
involved in related lawsuits were identical for purposes of collateral
estoppel was resolved in Coleman v. Columns Properties, Inc. 295 and
Winding River Village Condominium Ass'n v. Barnett.2"
The supreme court reversed the decision of the court of appeals in
Coleman, holding that the State Board of Workers' Compensation's
determination that the plaintiff failed to prove her injury "arose out of
and in the course of her employment" in the initial workers' compensation claim was a significantly different issue than whether the plaintiff
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
S.E.2d
295.
296.

Id. at 878-79, 463 S.E.2d at 2.
Id. at 879, 463 S.E.2d at 2 (Sears, J., dissenting).
Id. at 882, 463 S.E.2d at 4 (Sears, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 882-83, 463 S.E.2d at 5 (Sears, J., dissenting).
See the discussion of Waldroup v. Greene County Hosp. Auth., 265 Ga. 864, 463
5 (1995), supra at Section VI, analyzed in the context of malpractice affidavits.
266 Ga. 310, 467 S.E.2d 328 (1996).
218 Ga. App. 35, 459 S.E.2d 569 (1995).
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was an invitee in the subsequent premises liability action. 7 The
plaintiff in Coleman was employed by the defendant to clean houses
under construction by the defendant under the supervision of her
husband, who was a construction supervisor for the defendant. The
plaintiff was injured on one of the construction sites when she fell while
leaving her husband's job site office trailer after picking up her
paycheck.29 Ms. Coleman filed a workers' compensation claim, but the
Board denied the claim, finding that Coleman did not show that her fall
arose out of and in the course of her employment. Thereafter, Coleman
and her husband filed a premises liability action against the defendant,
alleging that she was an invitee of the defendant. The court of appeals
held that the Board's determination that Coleman was not within the
scope of her employment meant that Coleman was present at the site
either as a licensee or trespasser.2
Pointing out that an administrative decision can act as an estoppel in
a judicial proceeding with the same parties only if the issues are
identical, the supreme court held that the issues involved in Coleman's
actions were not identical.3" The issue in workers' compensation is
the relationship between the injury and the employment; the issue in
premises liability is the relationship between the injured individual and
the owner of the property."1 Therefore, collateral estoppel did not
operate to preclude the plaintiffs' premises liability claims. 3'
In Winding River Village, °3 much like the previously discussed
decision in Waldroup, the court of appeals looked to the effect of
collateral estoppel between a personal injury action and a subsequent
wrongful death action." 4 The plaintiff's young daughter fell into the
defendants' pool, nearly drowned, and sustained brain damage. The
child filed a personal injury suit against the defendants, and an
arbitration panel awarded damages to the plaintiff. This arbitration
award became the judgment of the trial court.'03 The child died soon
thereafter, and the plaintiff-parent filed a wrongful death action. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and also moved to add the

297. Coleman, 266 Ga. at 311-12, 467 S.E.2d at 330.
298. Id. at 310, 467 S.E.2d at 329.
299. Columns Properties, Inc. v. Coleman, 216 Ga. App. 428, 429, 454 S.E.2d 546, 548
(1995), reu'd, 266 Ga. 310, 467 S.E.2d 328 (1996).
300. Coleman, 266 Ga. at 311, 467 S.E.2d at 329-30.
301. Id., 467 S.E.2d at 330.
302. Id.
303. 218 Ga. App. 35, 459 S.E.2d 569 (1995).
304. The supreme court decision in Waldroup had not been decided until after the court
of appeals decided Winding River.

305. Winding River, 218 Ga. App. at 35, 459 S.E.2d at 570-71.
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child's mother as a party plaintiff. The trial court initially denied both
motions.'
The defendants argued that recovery in the personal injury action
extinguished any right to pursue a wrongful death action. The court
disagreed because the damages recoverable in the wrongful death
action-the full value of the life of the child and expenses resulting from
the death-were not recoverable in the personal injury action. 7
res judicata did not bar the plaintiff's wrongful death
Therefore,
08
action.

3

Next, the defendants argued that collateral estoppel could not be used
offensively to establish their negligence in the present action, even
though the arbitration panel had made an award against them in the
prior action. Again, the court of appeals disagreed, stating that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel has been asserted successfully by plaintiffs
in subsequent litigation. 3 1 "[11n reaching its decision, the arbitration
panel necessarily decided that Perry Realty and Winding River were
negligent and their negligence was a proximate cause of the decedent's
injuries."310 Under the rule of collateral estoppel, the defendants were
precluded from relitigating the issue of their negligence."
However, the court did agree with the defendants that the child's
mother should be added as a party plaintiff because issues concerning
her negligent supervision of the child could be litigated in the present
action and were not barred by collateral estoppel."' 2 In a personal
injury action, a parent's negligence cannot be imputed to the child, so
the issue of contributory negligence in the first action was not relevant
and was not litigated in the prior action." 3 But in an action for
wrongful death, the parent's contributory negligence is relevant, and the
total amount of damages may be reduced due to contributory negligence.314 The court held that collateral estoppel did not preclude the
defendants from asserting different defenses in the wrongful death
315
action than they were able to assert in the personal injury action.

306. Id. at 35-36, 459 S.E.2d at 571.
307. Id. at 36, 459 S.E.2d at 571.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 37,459 S.E.2d at 572 (citing McFadden Business Publications v. Guidry, 177
Ga. App. 885, 341 S.E.2d 294 (1986); Reese Realty Co. v. Pal Realty Co., 182 Ga. App. 215,
355 S.E.2d 125 (1987)).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 37-38, 459 S.E.2d at 572.
313. Id. at 38, 459 S.E.2d at 572.
314. Id., 459 S.E.2d at 572-73.
315. Id., 459 S.E.2d at 572.
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IX. DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL
Once a case is adjudged to be in default, the only issue remaining to
be decided at the default trial is the amount of damages to be recovered
by the plaintiff."'" The pertinent statute on default judgments is
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-55, which states:
If the case is still in default after the expiration of the period of 15
days, the plaintiff at any time thereafter shall be entitled to verdict
and judgment by default, in open court or in chambers, as if every item
and paragraph of the complaint or other original pleading were
supported by proper evidence, without the intervention of a jury, unless
the action is one ex delicto or involves unliquidated damages, in which
event the plaintiff shall be required to introduce evidence and establish
the amount of damages before the court without a jury, with the right
of the defendant to introduce evidence as to damages and the right of
either to move for a new trial in respect of such damages.317
Due to the default, the defendant is in the position of having admitted
every material allegation contained in the complaint. The Georgia
Supreme Court has previously addressed this issue and concluded that,
when the defendant's answer and other defensive pleadings are stricken
and default judgment is entered, the defendant is "in the position of
having admitted each and every material allegation of the plaintiff's
complaint except as to any damages alleged. Hence, he is concluded as
to his liability, and is estopped to contest the merits of the case. "si
A.

Default Trial on Damages
The court of appeals had two occasions to address issues involving a
trial on damages after default judgment was entered against the
defendants.3 19 In Magnan v. Miami Aircraft Support, both sides
argued that the trial judge erred in his rulings on what evidence could

316. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55 (1982); See also Holland v. Tennyson, 201 Ga. App. 125, 410
S.E.2d 447 (1991).
317. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55 (1982) (emphasis added).
318. Hazzard v. Phillips, 249 Ga. 24, 26, 287 S.E.2d 191, 193 (1982); accord Moss v.
Wilkie, 210 Ga. App. 688, 437 S.E.2d 367 (1993); Krystal Co. v. Carter, 180 Ga. App. 667,

350 S.E.2d 306 (1986); Southwest Community Hosp. &Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Thompson, 165
Ga. App. 442, 443, 301 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1983) ("The element of proximate cause, as well
as negligence, having been alleged in plaintiff's complaint is admitted due to the default.");
Whitby v. Maloy, 150 Ga. App. 575, 258 S.E.2d 181 (1979); Flanders v. Hill Aircraft &
Leasing Corp., 137 Ga. App. 286, 223 S.E.2d 482 (1976).
319. Magnan v. Miami Aircraft Support, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 855,459 S.E.2d 592 (1995);
Daniel v. Causey, 220 Ga. App. 589, 469 S.E.2d 839 (1996).
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be admitted by the defendant in default. The court of appeals first cited
the rule that the defendant is prohibited from introducing evidence
which goes to the right of recovery, even if the same evidence bears on
the assessment of damages.320 The court broke the cause of action
down into two components: "(1) the breach of a legal duty which resulted
in an injury and which gave rise to a right of recovery by virtue of the
default, and (2) the amount of damages."'
The court held that the
defendant's default did not result in the admission of any specific
amount of damages, and it could contest the issue of damages by "rigid
cross-examination" and by the introduction of evidence only as long as
it did not touch on the issue of liability. 22 The court found that
evidence going to the extent and effects of the plaintiffs' exposure to
pesticides was properly presented by the defendant.3"
The plaintiffs further argued that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that the "defendant has a right to dispute the damages even to
the point of showing their non-existence."324 Since the burden was on
the plaintiffs to prove their damages, the court of appeals found that the
instruction was a correct statement of law, and that the defendant was
allowed to contest whether the plaintiffs had met their burden of
showing any damages. 5
On its part, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of other
employees who were exposed to the pesticide but did not suffer injuries.
The court of appeals held that since the fact of injury was admitted by
the default, this evidence should be excluded. 26 This holding comports
with the well-established rule that the defendant is precluded from
introducing evidence as to damages if that same evidence touches on the
right of recovery.327
Daniel v. Causey.8 . is the flip side of Magnan, but in Daniel, the
defendants sought to exclude evidence going to liability. 9 Daniel is
a medical malpractice case in which the defendants went into default.
During the jury trial on damages, the trial court allowed the plaintiffs
to introduce evidence as to what the doctor did. The defendants argued

320. 217 Ga. App. at 856, 459 S.E.2d at 594.
321. Id.
322. Id.

323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
Id. at 857, 459 S.E.2d at 595.
Id.
Id. at 859, 459 S.E.2d at 596.

327. See Flanders v. Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp., 137 Ga. App. 286, 223 S.E.2d 482
(1976).

328. 220 Ga. App. 589, 469 S.E.2d 839 (1996).
329. Id. at 589, 469 S.E.2d at 839.
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that this evidence was relevant to liability rather than damages and
therefore should not be allowed. The court of appeals distinguished this
situation, however, pointing out that the issue of punitive damages was
before the jury.33° The court held that when punitive damages are
involved, evidence of the defendant's conduct is both relevant and
necessary to the issue of the amount of damages necessary to punish and
deter that conduct. 31
These results make sense. In a default situation, it is the defendant's
own omission or conduct which has created the predicament. If the
courts were to allow the defendant to introduce evidence tending to
negate liability, then it would get the same trial that it would have
received if it had not caused a default. Similarly, the defendant should
not be allowed to hide evidence of his or her wrongful conduct when
punitive damages are involved by going into default.
B. Default Judgment for Failure to Respond to Discovery
One significant case in the area of default judgments involves the use
of default judgment as a sanction for discovery abuse.332 O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-37(b) allows the sanction of default when a party fails to
obey or comply with an order to provide or permit discovery.333 In
Didio v. Chess,3" the defendant failed to respond to interrogatories
propounded by the plaintiff. The plaintiff mailed him a letter requesting
the responses by an extended date, but the defendant again failed to
respond. After a motion to compel and a discovery order directing the
defendant to answer the interrogatories within twenty days of receipt of
the order, the defendant still did not meet his deadline."3
On the
plaintiff's motion, the trial court found the defendant in contempt and
struck his answer.3"
The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the defendant willfully and
consciously disregarded the discovery order.3 7 Importantly, the court
of appeals held that the entire time from service of discovery to service
of answers to discovery is to be taken into account in determining
whether a party acted with conscious indifference to the consequences

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at 590, 469 S.E.2d at 840.
Id.
Didio v. Chess, 218 Ga. App. 550, 462 S.E.2d 450 (1995).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(b) (1993).
218 Ga. App. 550, 462 S.E.2d 450 (1995).
Id. at 550-51, 462 S.E.2d at 451-52.
Id at 551, 462 S.E.2d at 452.
Id.
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What transpires

between the time the order compelling discovery is propounded and the
deadline set by the order is important, but this holding by the court of
appeals recognizes the games played and delaying tactics employed by
parties before the order compelling discovery is entered and takes those
into account in deciding whether a party is willfully or consciously
disregarding a court order. In fact, in further recognition of these
tactics, the court specifically rejected the defendant's contention that the
responses he provided after the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt
precluded the default sanction." 9 This stance taken by the court
serves to enforce the trial courts' power to enforce their orders in the
face of disobedience to the laws and to their orders.
C. Dismissal as a Remedy for Spoliation of Evidence
On a related issue, the court of appeals, in Chapman v. Auto Owners
Insurance Co.,' approved the sanction of dismissing a party's case or
preventing a party's expert from testifying when that party engages in
spoliation of evidence. 41 In Chapman, the court was called on to
answer the question of "whether the trial court's only means to address
the destruction of evidence was to charge the jury that spoliation of
evidence raises a rebuttable presumption against the spoliator."' 2
This was an issue of first impression for the Georgia appellate courts,
and the court looked to other jurisdictions for analysis of the problem. 43
The facts of Chapman are as follows: In late January, 1992, a fire
occurred at a store which was insured by the plaintiff, Auto Owners
Insurance Company ("Auto Owners").
The defendant's (Chapman
Electrical) employees had been working at the store. The plaintiff hired
a consultant, ATS, to investigate the cause of the fire, and the ATS
employee removed wires, circuit breakers, and other electrical parts from
the store for testing. Shortly thereafter, the defendant's insurer
contacted ATS requesting inspection of the items removed, but this did
not take place.3" ATS concluded on March 9, 1992, that the fire was
caused by the negligence of one of the defendant's employees in cutting
into a live circuit. On April 5, 1993, the plaintiff filed the action, and

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
Id.
220 Ga. App. 539, 469 S.E.2d 783 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 539, 469 S.E.2d at 784.
Id. at 540, 469 S.E.2d at 784.
Id.
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ten days later ATS destroyed the wiring, circuit breakers, and other
items it had removed for the plaintiff. 4
The defendant moved for dismissal or for preclusion of the testimony
of the plaintiff's expert concerning the destroyed evidence. The trial
court held that under Georgia law, its only option was to give a jury
instruction on the negative presumption created when evidence is
spoliated.4 The court of appeals also found no Georgia cases which
address any other remedy for destruction of evidence. 47 Therefore, the
court looked to the law of other jurisdictions which have upheld the
exclusion of testimony about the destroyed evidence. 34 Looking to a
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 49 the court was
persuaded that a jury charge is insufficient to counter the prejudice
resulting to a party who is unable to put on a full argument or defense
because of the destruction of evidence."
The court of appeals was also persuaded that this remedy is predicated on the trial court's inherent power and discretion to control the course
of the case, to make evidentiary rulings conducive to a fair and orderly
trial, and to exclude relevant evidence if its prejudice outweighs its
probative value.38 1 The court was not inclined to agree with the
plaintiff's argument that photographs were an adequate substitute for
the destroyed evidence. Relying on a Massachusetts case, the court
noted that the "physical items themselves, in the precise condition they
were in immediately after the incident, would be far more useful and
persuasive to the jury than photographs."3 2
The court in Chapman took note of five factors delineated in Northern
Assurance Co. v. Ware 3 for assistance in deciding whether to exclude
testimony about the destroyed evidence:
(1) whether the [adverse party] was prejudiced as a result of the
destruction of the evidence; (2) whether the prejudice could be cured;
(3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the [party
destroying the evidence] acted in good or bad faith; and (5) the

345.
346.
347.

Id.
Id.; see O.C.G.A. § 24-4-22 (1995).
Chapman, 220 Ga. App. at 540, 469 S.E.2d at 784.

348. Id.
349. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g Corp., 982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1992).
350. Chapman, 220 Ga. App. at 540-41, 469 S.E.2d at 784.
351. Id. at 541, 469 S.E.2d at 784 (citing CRS Sirrine v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710,
713, 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994)).
352. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 785 (citing Nally v. Volkswagen of America, 539 N.E.2d 1017
(Mass. 1989)).
353. 145 F.R.D. 281 (D. Me. 1993).
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potential for abuse if expert testimony about the evidence was not
excluded.

4

Furthermore, the court also noted that in Ware, the district court stated
that the sanction of dismissal should be reserved for cases where a party
has maliciously destroyed relevant evidence with the purpose of
precluding another party from examining it."5
The court's holding is imminently reasonable, provided that it is
applied to either party-plaintiff or defendant-whenever spoliation of
evidence occurs. The court's holding does not limit the rule to one party
or the other. The court simply finds that in certain circumstances,
"allowing the case to proceed or an expert to testify about destroyed
evidence which the opposing party is unable to test may3 result
in trial
56
by ambush which cannot be cured by a jury instruction."
The trial courts now have at least three options upon spoliation of the
evidence: a curative jury instruction, preclusion of an expert from
testifying about the evidence, or dismissal. Thus the remedies which the
court of appeals adopts is largely a matter for the trial court's discretion.
X.

DISCOVERY PRACTICE

Of practical importance to trial lawyers in Georgia is the Georgia
General Assembly's amendment to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-30(b)(4) which
governs the recording of depositions on oral examination.3 57 The
former code section required a party to obtain an order from the court
in order to videotape a deposition. 3" However, effective July 1, 1996,
a deposition may be videotaped at the option of either party, unless the
court orders otherwise.

59

Other than cases previously cited in this article concerning discovery,
there were few cases concerning novel discovery issues during this
survey period. Only two issues decided by the court of appeals are
notable.
Surprisingly, the court of appeals decided a discovery dispute by
granting interlocutory appeal to the defendant in the case of Copher u.
Mackey.'
In this case, the plaintiff served on the defendant three
different sets of interrogatories, and no set of interrogatories totalled
over fifty, including subparts. But together, the sets totalled eighty-one,

354. Chapman, 220 Ga. App. at 542, 469 S.E.2d at 785.
355. Id. at 542, 469 S.E.2d at 785-86 (citing Ware, 145 F.R.D. at 282 n.2).
356. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 786.

357.
358.
359.
360.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-30(b)(4) (Supp. 1996).
Id. § 9-11-30(bX4) (1993).
Id. § 9-11-30(bX4) (Supp. 1996).
220 Ga. App. 43, 467 S.E.2d 362 (1996).
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including subparts. The defendant sought a protective order as to the
third set, which the trial court denied by concluding that the fifty
section 9-11-33 is a "per set" limit and
interrogatory limit of O.C.G.A.
361
not a cumulative limit.

The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court after a lengthy
analysis of the statute's history and purpose. After "considering the
evolution" of the statute, the court of appeals held that a party may not
serve a cumulative total of more than fifty interrogatories. 6 2 However, the court did note that the statute provides for serving more than
fifty interrogatories by leave of the trial court.'
Next, the case of Sturgill v. Garrison"e' involved the work product
protection afforded to statements given by a party to its insurer in
anticipation of litigation. In this case, the plaintiff gave a recorded
statement to an independent investigator hired by her insurer to
investigate the automobile wreck. The defendant served the investigator
with a request for production of documents in order to obtain the
statement. The plaintiff objected on the basis of the work product
protection. Though the defendant did not contest the plaintiff's
objection, he subpoenaed the investigator for a deposition. The plaintiff
therefore sought a protective order to prevent the deposition, but the
trial court denied the protective order.365
The defendant's argument that the deposition should be allowed was
not well taken. He argued that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(3) was not
applicable because that section deals with the discovery of documents
and tangible things. 366 The words of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(3) do
technically refer to documents and tangible things. 67 However, the
court correctly observed that a party who is not entitled to obtain a copy
of a plaintiff's statement to her insurer because that party cannot
demonstrate substantial need or undue hardship is certainly not entitled
to require production of the statement at a deposition, nor is he entitled
to require the investigator to testify as to the content of the statement."' The court held that the showing of substantial need and
undue hardship contained in O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(3) applies

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. at 43-44, 467 S.E.2d at 363.
Id. at 45, 467 S.E.2d at 364-65.
Id., 467 S.E.2d at 365.
219 Ga. App. 306, 464 S.E.2d 902 (1995).
Id. at 306, 464 S.E.2d at 902.
Id. at 306-07, 464 S.E.2d at 903. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b)(3) (1993).

367.
368.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b)(3) (1993).
Sturgill, 219 Ga. App. at 307, 464 S.E.2d at 903.
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equally to situations where a party seeks to obtain the equivalent of trial
preparation materials through a deposition.6
XI.

A.

VOIR DIRE OF JURY

Qualifying the Jury as to Relationships with Insurance Compa-

nies Involved
Perhaps two of the most important cases decided during the survey
period were Byrd v. Daus37 ° and Strickland v. Stubbs. 71 Decided
within days of each other by two separate panels of the court of appeals,
these cases involved the issue of whether the trial court must qualify the
jury with respect to their relationships with, or financial interests in, the
interested insurance companies to the action when requested by the
plaintiff. This issue continues to surface time and again, but the court
has remained steadfast in requiring the judge to qualify the jury on this
matter.372
In Byrd, a medical malpractice action, the trial court refused the
plaintiffs' request to qualify prospective jurors regarding any relationships they may have with MAG Mutual Insurance Company, the
defendant's insurer. 73 The trial court failed to specifically ask whether the panel had an interest in MAG Mutual Insurance Company and
asked only if anyone on the jury panel had a financial interest in the
case. 74 The trial court then further reviewed jury questionnaires to
determine if anyone on the panel was a doctor.37
The court of appeals acknowledged it was constrained to follow the
rule long propounded by the supreme court. 7 6 The failure to qualify

369, Id.
370. 218 Ga. App. 145, 460 S.E.2d 819 (1995).
371. 218 Ga. App. 279, 459 S.E.2d 473 (1995).
372. See, e.g., Franklin v. Tackett, 209 Ga. App. 448, 433 S.E.2d 710 (1993); Crosby
v. Spencer, 207 Ga. App. 487, 428 S.E.2d 607 (1993); Patterson v. Lauderback, 211 Ga.
App. 891, 440 S.E.2d 673 (1994); Gonzalez v. Wells, 213 Ga. App. 494, 445 S.E.2d 332
(1994).
373. Byrd, 218 Ga. App. at 145, 460 S.E.2d at 820.
374. Id. The trial judge relied on Judge Beasley's special concurrence in Franklin v.
Tackett, supra, explaining that he believed his question satisfied the plaintiffs right to
exclude anyone with an interest in the insurer, without interjecting the issue of insurance
into the case. Id.
375. Id. The trial judge apparently believed that since MAG Mutual is owned
exclusively by doctors, his review of the professions of the potential jurors revealing no
doctors satisfied him that no one could have a financial interest in the insurance company.
Id.
376. Id. at 146,460 S.E.2d at 820-21. See Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544,54951, 174 S.E. 131, 132-34 (1934).
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the jury as to this matter, once requested by the plaintiff, creates a
presumption of harmful error which requires the grant of a new
trial. 7 The court pointed out that the fact that no one on the jury
panel was a doctor, as revealed by the jury questionnaire, did not
eliminate the possibility that a member of the panel could have a
78
financial interest in the insurance company."
The court stated that
"even if there were no doctors on the panel itself, any member of one of
their immediate families may be a doctor or an employee of the
company, both of which could create a financial interest in the company
such that its disclosure was mandatory."379 The court thus held that
the trial court erred in not qualifying the jury panel with regard to MAG
Mutual Insurance Company and reversed. 3 °
Likewise, in Strickland, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's
duty to qualify prospective jurors as to relationships they may have with
any insurance carrier having a financial interest in the outcome of the
381
case.
Chief Judge Beasley appears to be the main proponent of changing
this long-standing precedent and has authored several special concurrences in support of her position that jurors should not be qualified
during voir dire as to their potential relationship with the interested
insurance company. 382 Her seminal concurrence came in Franklin v.
Tackett,3a where Chief Judge Beasley (then Presiding Judge) explored
the evolution of the current rule. Chief Judge Beasley's theory is that
a juror would not be biased by having a relationship with the interested
insurance company if that juror did not know that any insurance
company was involved, or did not know which insurance company may
be involved." s4 Therefore, according to Chief Judge Beasley, the jurors
should not be told that an insurance company is involved through voir
dire, in order to essentially keep the jurors innocent of this fact.38 5

377. Byrd, 218 Ga. App. at 146, 460 S.E.2d at 821.
378. Id.
379. Id.

380. Id.
381. Strickland, 218 Ga. App. at 279-80, 459 S.E.2d at 474 (1995) (citing Gonzalez v.
Wells, 213 Ga. App. 494, 495, 445 S.E.2d 332, 333-34 (1994)).
382. See Franklin v. Tackett, 209 Ga. App. 448, 450-55, 433 S.E.2d 710, 711-15 (1993)
(Beasley, P.J., concurring specially); Gonzalez v. Wells, 213 Ga. App. 494, 496-97, 445
S.E.2d 332, 334-35 (1994) (Beasley, P.J., concurring specially); and Strickland v. Stubbs,
218 Ga. App. 279, 281-82, 459 S.E.2d 473, 475-76 (1995) (Beasley, C.J., concurring
specially).
383. 209 Ga. App. 448, 450-55,433 S.E.2d 710, 711-15 (1993) (Beasley, P.J. concurring
specially).
384. Id. at 450, 433 S.E.2d at 711.
385. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 712.
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Chief Judge Beasley's reasoning is based upon the collateral source
rule that generally, liability insurance is not admissible in evidence, and
unnecessary disclosure of the fact is ground for a mistrial or reversal."'6 The court of appeals has held that this collateral source rule
*does not7 change the long-standing rule regarding qualification of
3
jurors. 8

The collateral source rule stems from the fact that irrelevant evidence
should be excluded. Since collateral source evidence is irrelevant to the
issues of liability and damages, it is excluded. However, there are
instances when collateral source evidence can be relevant and thus
admissible, such as when used to impeach testimony."' 5 If, during the
middle of a trial, collateral source evidence is introduced and the jurors
have not been qualified to reveal their biases, a mistrial will result,
causing loss of time, money, and judicial resources.
Furthermore, there is no way, in reality, to fully qualify the jury
through the use of the question of whether any of the panel is connected
in any way to anyone or to any company which has a financial interest
in the outcome of the case, as suggested by Chief Judge Beasley, or to
simply find out their employment and stock ownership. Again, Chief
Judge Beasley's theory is that if the juror is innocent of the fact that he
or she has such a connection, there, can be no bias. However, this
argument is flawed, as innocence can be quickly lost, and a juror could
find himself or herself in the position of becoming biased during the trial
if insurance were to become an issue.
To take this theory to the extreme, the most perfect, unbiased juror
would be one that did not know the identities of the parties to the case,
did not know the judge's identity, did not know the identities of any of
the witnesses, and did not know the identities of the other jurors. Such
a trial would need to be conducted by placing bags over everyone's
heads. There would not even be the need for voir dire of the jurors.
Obviously, such an example is impractical and serves only the point of
illustrating the importance of qualifying the jurors as to their potential

386. See Denton v. Con-way S. Express, 261 Ga. 41, 402 S.E.2d 269 (1991), overruled
by Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374, 376-77, 418 S.E.2d 27, 29-30 (1992).
387. Crosby v. Spencer, 207 Ga. App. 487, 490, 428 S.E.2d 607, 611 (1993); Franklin
v. Tackett, 209 Ga. App. 448, 450, 433 S.E.2d 710, 711 (1993).
388. Patterson v. Lauderback, 211 Ga. App. 891, 893, 440 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1994)
(evidence of the availability of collateral insurance benefits to pay medical bills, although
generally inadmissible, was relevant for the limited purpose of impeaching the plaintiffs
testimony).
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biases. As Chief Judge Beasley pointed out in her concurrence to
Franklin,
"an impartial jury is the corner-stone of the fairness of trial by
89
"

jury.3

B. Excusing for Cause a Juror who has an Ongoing Relationship
With a Defendant Doctor
A final case of significance is Baxter v. Cohen, g° in which the issue
to be decided was whether the trial court erred in refusing to excuse one
of the defendant doctor's current patients from the jury. During voir
dire, one of the potential jurors revealed that both she and her husband
were current patients of the defendant doctor and had been for ten
years. She had also acknowledged that she was not sure that she could
be fair and that it would probably be tougher to prove to her that the
defendant had done anything wrong. However, defense counsel coaxed
a response from the juror who finally indicated that she would listen to
the evidence and apply the law as the judge instructed. 9 1
The court noted the longstanding rule that "[jurors should come to
the consideration of a case ...

free from even a suspicion of prejudge-

ment or fixed opinion."39 2 The Baxter decision further indicates, based
on Luke v.Suber,39 s that "the better practice would be to eliminate
defendant's former patients (and their spouses) from the panel of
potential jurors if possible."394 After examining the treatment of this
issue in other states, the court adopted the view that while a more
liberal exclusion of jurors for cause may eliminate some jurors unnecessarily, in the interest of fairness, "if error is to be committed, let it be in
favor of the absolute impartiality and purity of the jurors. "39'
The court of appeals concluded, based on the facts in Baxter, that the
relationship of a current patient to his or her doctor is so close that
fairness requires that the juror be discharged where that doctor is a

389. Franklin, 209 Ga. App. at 451, 433 S.E.2d at 712 (Beasley, P.J., concurring
specially).
390. 220 Ga. App. 893, 470 S.E.2d 450 (1996).
391. Id. at 893, 470 S.E.2d at 450-51.
392. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 451 (quoting Ellison v. National By-Products, 153 Ga. App. 475,
476, 265 S.E.2d 829 (1980)).
393. 217 Ga. App. 84, 456 S.E.2d 598, (1995).
394. Baxter, 220 Ga. App. at 894 n.1, 470 S.E.2d at 451 n.1 (quoting Luke v. Suber, 217
Ga. App. 84, 87, 456 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1995)).
395. Id. at 894 n.2, 470 S.E.2d at 451 n.2 (quoting Cambron v. State, 164 Ga. 111, 114,
137 S.E. 780 (1927)).
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defendant in a medical malpractice case.'" The court found that to
expect a patient in this type of relationship of trust and confidence to be
objective in determining whether or not the doctor was negligent "simply
ignores reality and human nature." 7 Finally, the court of appeals
stated emphatically that "a court's refusal to excuse a current patient for
cause not only is unfair,... but makes a mockery of our judicial system
in the eyes of the public." 9 ' The court of appeals found this clear-cut
rule to be preferable to a rule only creating a rebuttable presumption; it
is easier to apply and promotes fairness."'
XII.

CONCLUSION

This survey is neither exhaustive nor all inclusive due to the number
of reported decisions. The authors hope that the discussion of the
highlighted decisions will be useful to readers of this survey.

396. Id. at 894,470 S.E.2d at 451. After the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed this decision of the court of appeals in Cohen v. Baxter, No. S96G1226, 97
F.C.D.R. 200 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1997). The supreme court held that it was in error to adopt a
per se rule that a potential juror must be excused for cause when he or she has an ongoing
doctor-patient relationship with the defendant doctor in a medical malpractice case. Id.
at 201. The supreme court stated that the trial court should retain its discretion to judge
the credibility of a juror. Id. The court also partially based its decision on the slippery
slope argument, rationalizing that the establishment of a per se rule to the doctor-patient
relationship would open the door to a per se rule for other categories of relationships. Id.
Finally, the court noted that a per se rule might make impanelling a full jury difficult in
medical malpractice trials in some rural counties. Id.
In a theoretical, "perfect" world setting, the supreme court's decision might be workable,
allowing trial court judges to divine whether a potential juror can be unbiased despite a
necessary relationship of trust and confidence with his or her doctor. The American
HeritageDictionary defines "bias" as a preference or inclination that inhibits impartiality.
In the real world, a potential juror who has chosen the defendant doctor as his or her
personal physician has openly exhibited his or her preference for that physician. It would
be naive to assume that the juror could remain completely impartial. The impact of the
supreme court's decision is to increase the plaintiff's burden of proof with respect to
disqualification of the patient-juror. One must query why the supreme court rejected the
court of appeals logic "if error is. to be committed, let it be in favor of the absolute
impartiality and purity of the jurors."
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 894 n.2, 470 S.E.2d at 451 n.2 (comparing the Alabama rule to the rule
adopted by Illinois and Vermont, and now Georgia).

